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A central concern – some might say obsession – of American administrative law
scholarship is the appropriate level of judicial deference to agency action. This issue
arises in a number of different contexts – from agency interpretations of congressional
statutes1 or agency regulations,2 to the adequacy of agency decision-making procedures
and processes,3 to the sufficiency of the evidence on which agencies base their
adjudicative decisions.4 Much of the academic legal literature considers the internal
logic, normative justification, or practical effect of the Supreme Court’s deference
doctrine with respect to these different categories of administrative decision-making. But
what, if anything, can explain broader patterns in the Supreme Court’s decisions in cases
that raise issues of the appropriate level of judicial deference to administrative agencies?
Do the Supreme Court’s deference decisions – which some scholars have criticized as
confusing and inconsistent5 – in fact advance systematically a consistent political or
normative agenda?
The goal of this paper is to examine not the “trees” (the internal logic of particular
cases or doctrinal tests), but rather the “forest” – the broad patterns of Supreme Court
deference to administrative agencies, and how the Court adjusts the appropriate level of
deference over time. In particular, this paper builds on, and critically re-evaluates, Linda
Cohen and Matthew Spitzer’s seminal work on the political economy of judicial
deference. Cohen and Spitzer advanced the claim that broad patterns in deference
doctrine are explicable as the Supreme Court’s deliberate transfers of decision-making

1

See Skidmore et al. v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); United States v. Mead Corp., 530 U.S. 218 (2001).
2
See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945); Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926 (1986).
3
See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978);
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Motor Vehicles Mnfrs. Ass’n v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
4
See Allentown Mack Sales & Service v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 539 (1998); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474 (1951).
5
See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447 (1986); Stephen Breyer,
Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN L. REV. 363 (1986); Sidney A. Shapiro &
Richard Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44
DUKE L. J. 1051 (1995).
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power back and forth between the executive agencies and the lower federal courts,
depending on which decision-makers the Supreme Court finds more ideologically
congenial at a given point in time. This perspective, Cohen and Spitzer claim, accounts
for empirically observable shifts in deference doctrine that emerge when the outcomes of
large numbers of Supreme Court cases are considered together.
Part I of this paper describes the Cohen-Spitzer rational choice theory of Supreme
Court deference doctrine, lays out that theory’s key assumptions, and summarizes the
supporting empirical evidence Cohen and Spitzer present. Part I then explains how this
paper assesses the empirical support for the theory, both by re-evaluating the time period
Cohen and Spitzer examine and by assessing whether their theory correctly predicts
patterns in the Court’s deference doctrine outside their original sample.
Part II describes in detail my methodological approach for re-evaluating and
extending the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis. Specifically, Part II describes how I estimate
the ideological orientation of the Supreme Court, the judges on the circuit courts of
appeal, and the administrative agencies. This Part also explains how I selected, coded,
and weighted the Supreme Court cases included in the study. Though I attempted to
follow Cohen and Spitzer’s approach in many respects, there are some important
differences between this study and theirs with respect to sample selection and
methodology; these differences are also discussed in Part II.
Part III presents the results of my empirical re-assessment of Cohen and Spitzer’s
rational choice theory of Supreme Court deference doctrine. I find surprisingly little
empirical support for their theory, at least in the strong form in which Cohen and Spitzer
originally presented it. On the one hand, my attempts to reproduce Cohen and Spitzer’s
results for the 1977-1990 period yielded evidence that, though somewhat inconsistent
with the data Cohen and Spitzer report, is broadly compatible with their theory inasmuch
as these results indicate an expansion of deference doctrine in the early 1980s. However,
in my extension of the empirical analysis to the 1990-2002 period, my results are the
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exact opposite of what the Cohen-Spitzer theory predicts. Instead of a contraction of
deference doctrine in the mid-1990s, the evidence indicates a significant expansion
during this period, with a contraction only after 2000 – a period when the Cohen-Spitzer
theory would presumably predict an expansion.
I also find little or no support for the Cohen-Spitzer theory when the sample is
restricted only to cases involving executive agencies (as opposed to independent
commissions), or when I compare how the Court treats cases on appeal from liberal and
conservative circuits. However, there does appear to be some evidence that, even though
the decisions of the Court do not seem consistent with the Cohen-Spitzer theory, the
votes of individual justices on opposite ends of the political spectrum (here, Stevens and
Rehnquist) do seem consistent with the theory’s general predictions.
Part IV considers the potential explanations for, and implications of, these
somewhat surprising empirical findings. In particular, I consider two new tentative
rational choice explanations for shifting patterns in Supreme Court deference doctrine.
First, it may be that deference doctrine tends to expand in response to regulatory
initiatives launched by a new presidential administration that differ substantially from
those of the preceding administration (the “presidential mandate” hypothesis). Second, I
suggest that the Supreme Court may have been ideologically moderate throughout the
relevant sample period, expanding deference doctrine whenever the circuit courts are too
liberal or too conservative (the “goldilocks” hypothesis). Though both these alternative
hypotheses appear to match the data in my sample somewhat better than the CohenSpitzer hypothesis, they generate divergent predictions for other periods. Thus, these
alternatives, and more refined versions of the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis, can and should
be tested against new data.
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I.

The Political Economy of Deference Doctrine: Theory, Evidence, and
Predictions

A. The Cohen-Sptizer Rational Choice Theory

In two important and influential articles, Linda Cohen and Matthew Spitzer
propose a simple, elegant political explanation for the Supreme Court’s shifting patterns
of decisions regarding the appropriate level of judicial deference to administrative
agencies.6 Cohen and Spitzer’s theory, which is grounded in the methodology of rational
choice, makes three key assumptions about judicial behavior. First, Cohen and Spitzer
assume that Supreme Court justices and lower court judges have ideological preferences
that can be characterized as “liberal” or “conservative” in the traditional sense, and that
these preferences influence judges’ decisions in the cases that come before them.7
Second, Cohen and Spitzer assume that lower court judges are constrained to some
degree by the decisions of the Supreme Court – perhaps because of some sincere
commitment to follow the Court’s precedent that may sometimes outweigh ideological
preferences, or perhaps because lower court judges want to avoid getting reversed on
6

The fully-developed version of the theory is presented in Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial
Deference to Agency Action: A Rational Choice Theory and an Empirical Test 68 SO. CAL. L. REV. 431
(1996) [hereinafter Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference]. This paper built on previous work in which
Cohen and Spitzer sought to explain, in rational choice terms, the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron,
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L.
Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65 (1994) [hereinafter Cohen & Spitzer,
Puzzle].
7
See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 441, 444. This assumption, though fairly
standard in the political science literature, see, e.g. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002), is still quite controversial among traditional legal
scholars. Ronald Dworkin, for example, questions whether the “distinction between conservative and
liberal justices is a useful distinction at all.” See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 386 (1986). However,
the idea that judges are influenced at least to some degree by their political inclinations is at this point wellestablished. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra. Though this statement should not be confused with the claim
that political attitudes are the exclusive or primary determinants of judicial behavior (the assumption is
often limited to the more modest and defensible claim that political views have some effect), Cohen and
Spitzer appear to take the stronger position that political/ideological considerations are sufficiently preeminent that their effect can be observed in Supreme Court decisions on deference questions even without
controlling for other, uncorrelated factors.
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appeal.8 Third, Cohen and Spitzer assume that the Supreme Court is primarily concerned
with how the deference doctrine it announces will influence the resolution of the vast
majority of cases that are decided by the lower courts without a hearing in the Supreme
Court.9 This assumption is critical. If the Supreme Court could review all cases,
manipulation of deference doctrine would be irrelevant, as the Court could resolve all
controversial cases on appeal. But, in an environment of limited resources, the Court will
presumably fashion its doctrine so as to influence the resolution of future cases, and this
consideration – rather than the specific issues raised by any particular case – should be
the primary determinants of the Court’s doctrinal pronouncements.10
Taken together, these three assumptions imply that the Supreme Court should
prescribe a higher level of judicial deference to administrative agencies when the
Supreme Court’s political preferences are more closely aligned with those of the
administrative agencies than with those of the federal appellate courts. In contrast, the
Supreme Court is expected to call for a reduction in the overall level of deference due to
administrative agencies when the Court believes its preferences are more closely aligned
with those of the lower courts than with those of the agencies. Thus, a conservative
Supreme Court facing liberal courts of appeal and a Republican administration should
favor a relatively high degree of deference, while a conservative Supreme Court with
reliably conservative lower courts but a liberal Democratic administration would prefer a

8

See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 435-39, 452-55.
See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 436-38.
10
The argument that the Supreme Court’s deference doctrine is shaped by its need to guide the decisions of
lower courts in the hierarchical federal system has been articulated most forcefully and influentially by
Peter Strauss. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1003 (1987). For
additional empirical evidence supporting this general point about hierarchical control in a different
doctrinal context see John Gruhl, The Supreme Court’s Impact on the Law of Libel: Compliance by Lower
Federal Courts, 33 W. POL. Q. 502 (1980). Similarly, the practice of stare decisis can be interpreted as
partly reflecting the Supreme Court’s need to influence lower court behavior through roughly consistent
patterns of decision-making. See Ethan Bueno de Mesquita & Matthew C. Stephenson, Informative
Precedent and Intrajudicial Communication , 96 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 755 (2002).
9
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lower level of judicial deference. The basic predictions of the Cohen-Spitzer rational
choice model are shown below in Table 1.

[Table 1 about here]

B. The Evidence for the Cohen-Spitzer Theory: The 1980s Deference
Expansion

The Cohen-Spitzer rational choice explanation for the Court’s deference doctrine
would be a valuable theoretical contribution in its own right. But Cohen and Spitzer go
further. They claim that empirical data on Supreme Court administrative law decisions
between 1977 and 1990 support the predictions of their hypothesis. In particular, they
argue that an examination of case outcomes during this time period shows an increase in
the level of judicial deference advocated by the Supreme Court in the early to mid-1980s,
and a gradual tapering off in the later 1980s.11 Cohen and Spitzer interpret this pattern as
follows.
In the late 1970s, the Supreme Court was relatively moderate, with some staunch
conservatives (Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist), some passionate liberals
(Justices Brennan and Marshall), and a core of moderately conservative centrists (e.g.,
Justices Powell and Stewart). Even though the Supreme Court at this time could not,
perhaps, be deemed “conservative” in a strong sense, it was nonetheless probably more
conservative than Carter administration executive agencies. It was certainly more
conservative than the federal courts of appeals, which were still filled primarily with
Democratic appointees, many of whom were unapologetic liberal judicial activists.12
11

See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 464-66.
The most prominent and influential of these liberal judges were probably three D.C. Circuit judges –
David Bazelon, Skelly Wright, and Harold Leventhal – whose opinions were often at odds with the more
conservative Supreme Court. See Matthew Warren, Active Judging: Judicial Philosophy and the
Development of the Hard Look Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 90 GEO. L. J. 2599 (2002); see also Roy W.

12
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This situation corresponds roughly to row 4 in Table 1. Whether the Court should
advocate high or low levels of deference in these circumstances depends on whether the
circuits are more liberal than the agencies (which would imply higher deference) or
whether they are more conservative (implying lower deference). In either case, the effect
on deference doctrine is expected to be muted compared to what happened next.
In the early 1980s, following Ronald Reagan’s election, the executive agencies
lurched sharply to the right.13 And, the Supreme Court shifted rightwards as well, with
the relatively conservative Sandra Day O’Connor replacing the more moderate Potter
Stewart in 1981.14 However, the judges on the federal courts of appeals remained quite
liberal overall. Thus, the situation in the early-to-mid 1980s corresponded to row 2 in
Table 1, implying that the Supreme Court should signal to the lower courts that they
ought to be more deferential to executive branch agencies. This, according to Cohen and
Spitzer, is precisely what one finds in the data.
Cohen and Spitzer further find that pro-deference signals from the Supreme Court
appeared to decline in the late 1980s. Here, Cohen and Spitzer rightly point out that the
absolute deference signal is less important than the trend, i.e. whether the Court is
signaling to lower courts that they should increase or decrease their deference relative to
the status quo. As the circuit courts adjusted to the Supreme Court’s new, more prodeference doctrine, the Court had less need to send strong pro-deference signals.15 Thus,
the lower levels of pro-deference signals in the later years of the Cohen-Spitzer dataset

McLeese III, Disagreement in D.C.: The Relationship Between the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit
and its Implications for a National Court of Appeals, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1048 (1984).
13
This intuitive point has been validated empirically by examinations of changes in agency policy after
President Reagan’s election. See, e.g. B. Dan Wood, Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in
Clean Air Enforcments, 82 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 213 (1988).
14
In Cohen and Spitzer’s analysis, the Supreme Court’s ideological position did not shift with this or any
other appointment in the relevant time period, because the median justice under their coding methodology
was always moderately conservative (appointed by a Republican president and confirmed by a Democratic
senate). See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 47. Alternative coding methodologies
yields somewhat different results for the Supreme Court’s ideology, see infra TAN 30-37, but the basic
story is the same in either case.
15
See infra note 75.
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can be interpreted as a return to equilibrium – though a new equilibrium in which the
circuit courts are more deferential to administrative agency decisions than they had been
under the old 1970s equilibrium. Another interpretation, also consistent with the general
pattern Cohen and Spitzer claim to observe, is that by the late 1980s the courts of appeal
were considerably more conservative than they had been in the early 1980s, since Reagan
and Bush appointees had replaced Carter, Johnson, and Kennedy appointees. Thus, the
situation by the late 1980s may have corresponded more to the situation described in row
1 of Table 1, where all three relevant players are conservative, and therefore the
prediction as to deference doctrine is more ambiguous, but probably lower than what the
Court would have demanded in the earlier period, where it had a more adversarial
political relationship with the lower courts.

C. Out-of-Sample Predictions: Extending the Cohen-Spitzer Theory to
the Clinton Administration and Beyond

The Cohen-Spitzer study is exemplary in part because the theory it develops,
besides being consistent with the data the authors had available to them at the time,
generates clear, falsifiable predictions that can be tested against data outside of the
original sample. And, as luck would have it, recent political history provides an ideal
opportunity for testing the robustness of the Cohen-Spitzer rational choice theory against
new data. Recall that the theory implies an unambiguous prediction about what ought to
happen when the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts are conservative, but the
agencies are liberal. This situation, which corresponds to row 3 in Table 1, predicts a
doctrine calling for relatively lower levels of judicial deference to administrative
agencies. And, this political alignment – a relatively conservative Supreme Court and
courts of appeals, but relatively liberal executive agencies – corresponds to the conditions
that prevailed under the Clinton administration, at least in its early years. Thus,
Stephenson – Judicial Deference Draft 7/13/2004

9

deference doctrine should have contracted in the mid-1990s. Cohen and Spitzer make
such a prediction explicitly, arguing that:
[i]n the Clinton Presidency, one would expect administrative agencies to move
significantly to the left… But the majority of Justices and judges on both the
Supreme Court and courts of appeals will probably remain conservative; it will take a
while for Clinton’s appointments to move these two institutions. Assuming that the
Justices on the Supreme Court are not so enamored of deference that it swamps their
preferences for conservative policy outcomes, the Supreme Court will most likely
signal courts of appeals to give less deference to administrative agencies.16
If the Cohen-Spitzer theory is correct, then, we ought to observe a contraction of
judicial deference doctrine around 1992-1995, and a gradual return to equilibrium
sometime in the late 1990s – say, around 1997-1999. In order to test this hypothesis, and
to explore alternative or complementary explanations for changes in patterns of the
Supreme Court’s deference doctrine over time, I attempt to reproduce Cohen and
Spitzer’s empirical assessment of the 1977-1990 period, and I then extend the analysis to
cover the 1991-2002 period. Unfortunately, because Cohen and Spitzer’s case coding
methodology is not clearly explained in their papers, I could not replicate their sample or
their methods precisely. I therefore employed what seemed like the most sensible
method for gathering and coding administrative law cases for their pro- or anti-deference
content, consistent with the general theory Cohen and Spitzer lay out. While I attempt to
replicate Cohen and Spitzer’s method for weighting the cases (by counting reversals of
lower court decisions as stronger signals than affirmances), I also employ an alternative
influence-weighting method based on subsequent case citations. In addition, I follow
Cohen and Spitzer in examining whether there are systematic differences in deference
doctrine toward executive agencies as opposed to independent agencies. I also
investigate whether there are systematic differences in how conservative and liberal
justices decide cases raising a deference question – as the Cohen and Spitzer theory

16

Cohen & Spitzer, Puzzle, supra note 6 at 108-09.
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presumably would predict – and whether the Court treats liberal and conservative circuits
differently when issuing its rulings.

II.

Methodology

In the interests of making my empirical evaluation of the Cohen-Spitzer
hypothesis as transparent and replicable as possible, this Part discusses methodological
issues in some detail. In particular, I first describe my assumptions about the relative
ideological positions of the Supreme Court, circuit courts, and federal agencies at
different points in the sample period, and the evidence supporting these assumptions. I
then explain how I selected the cases for inclusion in my sample and how I coded these
cases for their pro- or anti-deference content, and I describe the various weighting
techniques I employed for aggregating the cases to produce an overall annual deference
signal for each year in the sample. Readers who are less interested in these
methodological details may prefer to skim this Part and focus on the subsequent
discussion of results and implications in Parts III and IV.

A. Assessing the Players’ Ideology

In order to operationalize the Cohen-Spitzer model for empirical testing, I must
first characterize the political ideology of the Supreme Court, the circuit courts, and the
executive agencies. For the most part, I follow Cohen and Spitzer’s methodology in
order to maximize comparability between their study and mine. However, I take a
different approach in some respects, particularly with regard to assessing the ideology of
the Supreme Court. My assumptions about the political preferences of the agencies, the
circuit courts, and the Supreme Court are discussed in turn.
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1. Agency Ideology

Like Cohen and Spitzer, I assume that the political ideology of administrative
agencies is determined primarily by the political ideology of the president. Thus, I
assume that the agencies were liberal in 1977-1980 and 1993-2000, and conservative in
1981-1992 and 2001-2002. This assumption is generally reasonable, given the strong
evidence of presidential influence over agency policy.17 Inasmuch as operationalizing the
Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis depends on correctly predicting the changes in agency ideology
from year to year, therefore, using the president’s party as a proxy ought to be
sufficient.18
17

See, e.g. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2246 (2001); Terry M. Moe, An
Assessment of the Positive Theory of “Congressional Dominance, 12 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 475 (1987); Thomas
H. Hammond & Jack H. Knott, Who Controls the Bureaucracy? Presidential Power, Congressional
Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional PolicyMaking, 12 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 119 (1996); Scott R. Furlong, Political Influence on the Bureaucracy: The
Bureaucracy Speaks, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 39 (1998). However, this assumption is subject to
a few important caveats and qualifications. First, political actors – for example, the Senate (which must
confirm many agency leaders) and Congressional subcommittees (with oversight and appropriations power)
– also influence agency policy, and these other actors may not share the president’s political ideology. See,
e.g., Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory
Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983); J.R. DeShazo & Jody
Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443 (2003);
Anne M. Joseph, Called to Testify: Congressional Oversight of Presidential Appointees and the
Administrative State (Feb. 7, 2003) [unpublished manuscript, on file with author]. Second, agencies have
their own culture and sense of mission, and even political appointees can sometimes “go native,” seeking to
advance the agency’s agenda even when it diverges from the president’s priorities. See, e.g., Bruce
Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 700-01 (2000), HAROLD SEIDMAN &
ROBERT GILMOUR, POLITICS, POSITION AND POWER (1986). Third, presidents may sometimes appoint
agency heads with divergent ideologies in order to improve the credibility of their commitments to certain
policies. See Daniel F. Spulber & David Besanko, Delegation, Commitment, and the Regulatory Mandate,
8 J. L. Econ. & Org. 126, 135-37 (1992). For these reasons, the difference between the political ideology
of agencies may vary less with the presidential administration than it might first appear. Nonetheless, as a
comparative matter, it still seems fair to say that administrative agencies are much more conservative under
Republican administrations than under Democratic administrations.
18
This would not be the case, though, if the ideologies of the agencies and those of the courts were on very
different scales. For instance, if for some reason administrative agencies under Republican presidents were
more liberal than judges appointed by Democratic presidents, then the analysis would be confounded. A
shift from a Democratic to a Republican presidential administration in this example would not change the
fact that a Supreme Court dominated by Republican appointees would prefer low levels of deference.
However, three is no a priori reason to suppose that this extreme divergence in judicial ideology and
agency ideology actually obtains. Moreover, there is some evidence indicating that in fact the ideologies of
Senators, Presidents, and Supreme Court justices vary within a similar range. See Michael Bailey,
“Comparing Presidents, Senators, and Justices, 1946-2002” (2003) [unpublished draft, on file with author].
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However, though the president has a great deal of authority over executive branch
agencies, he has less direct control over independent agencies.19 Therefore, following
Cohen and Spitzer, I test for noticeable differences between cases involving executive
branch agencies and those involving independent agencies. If the Cohen-Spitzer theory
is correct, then shifts in deference doctrine – both expansions and contractions – ought to
be more pronounced for executive agencies than for independent agencies.

2. Circuit Court Ideology

I next must estimate the average political ideology of the U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeal. Here, I again follow Cohen and Spitzer’s methodology.20 Each judge on the
federal courts of appeal receives an ideology score of +1 (conservative) if that judge was
appointed by a Republican president and confirmed by a Republican senate, and gets an
ideology score of –1 (liberal) if the judge was appointed by a Democratic president with a
Democratic senate. Judges appointed by a Republican president with a Democratic
senate, or appointed by a Democratic president with a Republican senate, are assigned
ideology scores of +0.7 and –0.7, respectively. The choice of 0.7 is admittedly arbitrary,
and is intended to reflect the greater – but not absolute – power that the president has
over the ideology of the judges he appoints.21 As long as that assumption is reasonable,
the choice of 0.7 is justifiable. But, choosing some other number between 0 and 1 would
not substantially change the qualitative results.22 Again following Cohen and Spitzer, I
19

See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, surpa note 6, at 447-51.
See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 445-47.
21
See William G. Ross, The Supreme Court Appointment Process: A Search for a Synthesis, 57 Alb. L.
Rev. 993, 1021 (1994); Trece y E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L. J. 1635, 1651 (1998). See also Jeffrey A. Segal et al., A Spatial Model
of Roll Call Voting: Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court
Nominations, 36 AMER. J. POL. SCI. 96 (1992).
22
If one believed that the president and the senate had equal influence over the ideology of judicial
appointees, then all judges whose appointing president and confirming senate are of different parties should
get an ideology score of 0. If one believed that the senate actually exerted more influence over the
ideology of judicial appointees than the president, then the sign would reverse, such that a judge appointed
20
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weight active status judges twice as heavily as senior status judges, to reflect the reduced
caseload, and consequent reduced ideological influence, of the latter set of judges.23
For each year from 1977 to 2002, I take the average ideology score for all the
judges on the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.24 The average circuit court ideology for
each year is shown below in Table 2 and depicted graphically in Figure 1. The circuit
courts tended, on the whole, to be quite liberal through the mid-1980s. However, by the
late 1980s and through the early 1990s, the circuits became progressively more
conservative, as Presidents Reagan and Bush replaced retiring Democratic judicial
appointees with more conservative successors. Under Clinton, the trend reversed, but the
circuits did not become anywhere near as liberal as they had been under Carter and in the
early Reagan years. By the end of the Clinton administration in 2000, the average circuit
ideology score was about where it was in 1987 – approximately zero. Using 0.1 and –0.1
as arbitrary cut-off points, we can say that, of the years considered in the sample, the
federal circuit courts were liberal from 1977 until about 1985, conservative from 1990 to
1996, and relatively moderate in the 1986-1989 and the 1997-2002 periods.

[Table 2 about here]
[Figure 1 about here]

by a Republican president with a Democratic senate would be coded as more liberal than a judge appointed
by a Democratic president with a Republican senate. However, most observers and scholars have generally
concluded that the president has greater – though not absolute – control over the ideology of judicial
appointees. See supra note 21. Thus, the Cohen -Spitzer coding rules seem appropriate.
23
See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 445-47. See also 28 U.S.C. §371 (2000)
(statutory provisions governing senior status retirement).
24
Formally, the ideology score for each year is equal to:
N A DD ) + (0.7)( N A RD N A DR ) + (0.5)( N S RR N S DD ) + (0.35)( N S RD N S DR )
N A RR + N A DD + N A RD + N A DR + (0.5)( N S RR + N S DD + N S RD + N S DR )
where N indicates the number of judges in each category, the superscript on N denotes active status (A) or
senior status (S), the first subscript denotes the party of the appointing president – Democrat (D) or
Republican (R) – and the second subscript denotes the party of the confirming Senate.
( N A RR
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The foregoing assessment is subject to two important qualifications. First, this
coding methodology assumes that the partisan effects on judicial ideology are constant
across administrations. Thus, for example, the analysis assumed that Clinton nominees
are ideologically similar to Carter or Truman nominees, that Reagan nominees are
ideologically similar to Eisenhower or Nixon nominees. This assumption is open to
question. Some believe that the appointment process has become more ideological over
time.25 If this is the case, then more recent appointees should have ideological scores
with larger absolute values. Also, party positions may have shifted – many might argue,
for instance, that Clinton’s judicial nominees were systematically more conservative than
those of his Democratic predecessors, and that Reagan and Bush’s nominees were also
more conservative than those of previous Republican administrations.26 If this is true,
then the quantitative results above understate the conservative shift in the 1980s and early
1990s, and exaggerate the subsequent liberal reversal. More refined measurements of
circuit court ideology are deferred for future research, but the foregoing caveat should be
kept in mind when interpreting the results.
The second qualification to the results presented in Table 6 and Figure 1 is that
the average ideology scores of all the circuits taken together obscure important intercircuit ideological variation. For example, the D.C. circuit – by far the most important
circuit for resolving issues involving the power of administrative agencies – was quite
liberal up until 1985, and conservative in 1991-1996 and in 2000-2001. It was moderate
by my classification standard (i.e., the absolute value of its average ideology score was
below 0.1) in 1986-1990, 1997-1999, and 2002 (See Figure 2). In contrast, the Ninth
25

See Sheldon Goldman, Reagan’s Judicial Legacy: Completing the Puzzle and Summing Up, 72
JUDICATURE 318, 319-20 (1989); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 38-47 (1997). See also
generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (2000).
26
See William E. Kovacic, The Reagan Judiciary and Environmental Policy: The Impact of Appointments
to the Federal Courts of Appeals, 18 B.C. ENVT’L. AFF. L. REV. 669 (1991); Ronald Stidham et al., The
Voting Behavior of President Clinton’s Judicial Appointees, 80 JUDICATURE 16 (1996); Stephen M. Griffin,
Legal Liberalism at Yale, 14 CONST. COMMENTARY 535, 550 (1997).
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Circuit was liberal in 1978-1986 and in 1999-2002; in all other years it was moderate
(See Figure 3). Meanwhile, the Seventh Circuit was liberal until 1981, moderate from
1982 to 1984, and consistently conservative thereafter (See Figure 4). Thus,
generalizations about nationwide trends toward “liberal” or “conservative” courts of
appeal, though meaningful, obscure some important differences between circuits. I will
consider below if there are observable variations in the deference doctrine the Supreme
Court tends to articulate when dealing with an appeal from a more liberal circuit as
compared to what it does when hearing an appeal from a more conservative circuit.27

[Figure 2 about here]
[Figure 3 about here]
[Figure 4 about here]

3. Supreme Court Ideology

Cohen and Spitzer use the same methodology for determining ideology of
Supreme Court justices that they use to calculate the ideology of circuit court judges, and
they presume that the ideology of the Supreme Court can be represented by the ideology
of the median justice.28 But, there are other methods for estimating the ideological
preferences of Supreme Court justices, several of which have been employed to generate
estimated ideal points for all the justices on the Court in the sample period studied here. I
consider four possible proxies for Supreme Court justice ideology, and, for each one, I
consider both the predicted ideology of the median justice and the mean ideology score
for the whole Court.29
27

See Part III.B.2, infra.
See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 447
29
The argument for using the median justice to measure the Court’s ideology would be that the swing voter
(i.e. the median) can always get an outcome at her ideal point in a majority-rule voting system with a onedimensional policy space. However, an exclusive focus on the median justice may be misleading inasmuch
28
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The first of the four measures I consider is Cohen and Spitzer’s method, described
above. Second, I examine the Segal-Cover scores.30 These scores, which presume a
unidimensional liberal-conservative measure of judicial ideology,31 are derived from
newspaper editorials written about the justices between the time that they were nominated
to the Court and the time that they were confirmed.32 Third, I use estimated judicial ideal
points from two recent studies, one by Michael Bailey,33 the other by Andrew Martin and
Kevin Quinn,34 which employ sophisticated multidimensional scaling models to infer
judicial ideal points from actual votes in decided cases.35 Of these four measures, the
Bailey and Martin-Quinn calculations appear preferable on methodological grounds, as
they are derived from more, and more reliable, data about each justice’s revealed
preferences. They also appear more consistent with widely held intuitions about the
ideology of the individual justices, e.g. that Justice Stevens is more liberal than Justice
O’Connor, and that Justice Brennan was more liberal than Justice White.
The ideology score for each justice, as derived from each of these four measures,
is shown in Table 3, and the mean and median ideology score for each Court are shown
in Table 4. The numerical values in each column are not directly comparable, because
the measures are scaled differently. However, the directional movements at each major
transition point (where one justice departs the Court and is replaced by another) can be
compared, and the direction of ideological change (if any) according to each possible
as the actual process of forming a majority coalition and drafting the language of the opinion involves a
more complicated bargaining process. Using the mean ideology score better reflects the influence that
more ideologically extreme justices may have on final outcomes.
30
See Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court
Justices, 83 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological Values and the Votes of
U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812 (1995).
31
See Segal & Cover, supra note 30, at 559.
32
See Segal & Cover, supra note 30, at 559-60.
33
Michael Bailey, “Comparing Presidents, Senators, and Justices, 1946-2002” (Sept. 2002) [Unpublished
manuscript, on file with author].
34
Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, “Bayesian Learning about Ideal Points of U.S. Supreme Court
Justices, 1953-1999” (July 9, 2001) [Unpublished manuscript, on file with author].
35
These models generate more complex output than the simple Segal-Cover scores. I rely on the “posterior
mean” ideal point calculated by Martin & Quinn, see supra note 34 at 33, and the “Theta” score for each
justice calculated by Bailey, see supra note 33 at 23.
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measure of Court ideology is shown below in Table 5. I also re-scale seven of the eight
measures36 on a unit interval, where the “0” value is assigned to the period where,
according to that measure, the Court was most liberal, and the “1” is assigned to the
period where the Court was most conservative. These values, depicted in Figure 5 and
Figure 6, are still not directly comparable, but they are useful in showing which transition
points represented the most significant ideological shifts, according to each measure.

[Table 3 about here]
[Table 4 about here]
[Figure 5 about here]
[Figure 6 about here]

The results for mean Supreme Court ideology (Figure 5) are broadly consistent
across all four measures. The 1977-1981 period was the most liberal Court in the sample,
the Court became somewhat more conservative in the 1982-1990 period, and it became
sharply more conservative from 1991 to 1993 (the most conservative Court in the
sample). The Court became somewhat more liberal in the 1994-2002 period, but was not
as liberal as it had been in 1991 or before.
The results for the ideology of the median justice (Figure 6) are less consistent
across indicators, and generally more difficult to interpret. First, the ideology of the
median justice according to the Cohen-Spitzer party-based technique is 0.7 – the score
associated with a Justice appointed by a Republican president and confirmed by a
Democratic Senate – in every year in the sample. Second, the Segal-Cover median scores
indicate that the Court shifted to the left in 1988-1991 (with Kennedy replacing Powell
and Souter replacing Brennan), which seems intuitively wrong based on what we know
36

I do not rescale the median justice’s ideology score as measured by the Cohen-Spitzer method, because
this measure does not vary throughout the sample period.
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about the political ideologies of these justices. Restricting the focus to the Bailey and
Martin-Quinn measures reveals a more sensible pattern, and one broadly consistent with
the pattern observed for mean ideology scores: the Court became somewhat more
conservative in the early 1980s (when O’Conner replaced Stewart), and sharply more
conservative in the early 1990s (when Thomas replaced Marshall).37
For purposes of the subsequent discussion and analysis, I will concentrate on what
I conclude, from the foregoing data, are the two most important and relevant shifts in
Supreme Court ideology in the sample period: a first rightward shift in 1981-82, and a
second, somewhat more pronounced rightward shift in 1991-92.

B. Sample Selection

In order to test whether the ideological shifts discussed above had the predicted
effect on Supreme Court deference decisions, I must identify the relevant cases in the
sample period and code them for the strength and direction of the deference signal they
send. Ideally, this research would replicate the Cohen-Spitzer project by employing, at
least initially, identical cases selection and coding techniques. However, Cohen and
Spitzer’s dataset is not publicly available, and their paper does not provide a description
of their techniques that is detailed enough to generate identical data.38 I therefore employ
my own method, making use of the search tools available through a number of existing
on-line databases to compile the set of Supreme Court cases, decided between 1977 and

37

Even here there are some important inconsistencies. First, while both Martin-Quinn and Bailey’s
estimates show the Court becoming more conservative in 1981-82, Bailey estimates that this was a
relatively large change (about as large as the in 1991 shift), but Martin and Quinn estimate that it was an
extraordinarily small change – almost imperceptible when compared to the 1991 change. Second,
considering only the median, rather than the mean, indicates no significant change in Supreme Court
ideology from 1992 to 2002, whereas the mean ideology shifted to the left in this period.
38
I contacted Professors Cohen and Spitzer requesting either their original data or a detailed description of
their coding methodology, but unfortunately they were unable to provide this information.
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2002, in which a significant portion of the opinion dealt with the issue of how much
deference reviewing courts ought to accord to agency decisions.
I searched three on-line databases of Supreme Court opinions: Westlaw, Lexis,
and USSCPlus,39 using search assistant tools provided by each of these sources.40 I also
performed a supplemental Lexis keyword search,41 and used Westlaw’s KeyCite subject
headings to check for additional cases on the same legal topics that did not come up in
the other searches.42 I eliminated from the data set all those cases that did not involve
some issue relating to the amount of deference that the judiciary ought to accord to an
administrative agency’s decision. My case selection procedure yielded 221 relevant
cases in the 1977-2002 period, or an average of 8.5 cases per year.43 A complete list of
the 221 cases included in the analysis is provided in Appendix A.
There are three potentially important distinctions between my approach to sample
selection and Cohen and Spitzer’s approach. First, Cohen and Spitzer – at least in their
first paper – claim to restrict their attention to statutory interpretation cases.44 However,
39

All the searches were conducted December 23-25, 2002.
On Westlaw, I examined all cases listed in Westlaw’s KeySearch service under the headings
“Administrative Law – Judicial Review – Scope of Review” and “Administrative Law – Statutory
Construction.” On Lexis, I examined all cases listed in Lexis’s Search Advisor under the heading
“Administrative Law – Judicial Review – Standards of Review – Standards Generally.” On USSCPlus, I
examined all cases under the heading “Administrative Law.” The use of these on-line search assistants
may be justified not only because they are convenient for the researcher, but also because inclusion of a
case in such a directory is likely to correlate strongly with whether that case would be viewed by lower
courts as an important signal of the Supreme Court’s views.
41
I searched for any variant on the words “agency” or “commission” within five words of the word
“interpretation.”
42
I did this by checking the Westlaw KeyCite headnotes for each case found through the initial searches,
identifying those headnotes that were most relevant to the issue of judicial deference to agency decisions,
and using Westlaw’s “Most Cited Cases” function to identify all other Supreme Court cases that raised the
same legal issue. If any of these cases raised an issue of judicial deference to an agency decision, I added
the case to the dataset. . This procedure identified an additional 33 cases for inclusion in the dataset.
43
It is worth noting the relatively high degree of variance in the number of cases decided in different years.
The year in the dataset with the most cases is 1981 – sixteen decisions that year involved some issue of the
appropriate level of judicial deference to agency decisions. In contrast, 1993 saw only three such cases –
the lowest number for any year in the sample. The variance of number of cases decided per year is 12.1,
and the standard deviation is 3.48.
44
See Cohen & Spitzer, Puzzle, supra note 6 at 103 (stating that their dataset contains “administrative
appeals that required a decision on statutory interpretation”). The later paper also appears at the outset to
focus exclusively on deference to agency statutory interpretations. See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial
Deference, supra note 6 at 433 (“We consider specifically the doctrine of judicial deference, elucidated in
40
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my dataset includes cases where some issue regarding the degree of judicial control over
agency decision-making came up; the cases are not limited to statutory interpretation (i.e.
Chevron) cases, nor are the cases distinguished according to the doctrinal categories into
which lawyers and legal scholars would normally sort them. I took this approach for two
reasons. The first and more substantive reason is that the hypothesis under consideration
– that the Supreme Court shifts power to its ideological allies – does not differentiate, as
lawyers arguing a case might, between different types of agency action and the different
tests or verbal formulations that courts employ. One might press this point further by
suggesting that the ordinary doctrinal classifications may obscure the degree to which the
Supreme Court shifts power between agencies and reviewing courts, but that these
patterns become clearer when evaluating all such cases together. The second reason for
considering doctrinally distinct cases in one dataset is that, given the relatively small
number of cases – only 221 total – subdividing the data set by doctrinal category is likely
to make it too difficult to discern general patterns.45
The second difference is that Cohen and Spitzer (at least in their latter paper)
appear to consider all cases in which the Supreme Court heard an appeal from a case
involving an administrative agency, looking at whether the government won or lost at the
circuit court level and the Supreme Court level, without filtering out those cases that
raised no real issue of deference to an agency decision. Because I did not have access to
Cohen and Spitzer’s dataset, I cannot verify that this is the case, but it seems likely given

Chevron … wherein the Supreme Court instructed appellate courts to defer to any ‘reasonable’ statutory
interpretation offered by administrative agencies.”) However, the numbers of Supreme Court cases per
year reported in the second paper are considerably higher than the number reported in the first paper,
suggesting that the dataset used for the later work included additional cases. Compare Cohen & Spitzer,
Puzzle, supra note 6 at 103 Tab.7 with Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6 at 459 Tab.3.
45
On this point, the numbers of statutory interpretation cases that Cohen and Spitzer report seem too large.
For example, they claim that in 1989, 13 Supreme Court cases dealt with an issue of deference to an agency
statutory interpretation. See Cohen & Spitzer, Puzzle, supra note 6 at 103 Tab. 7. However, a Westlaw
search revealed only three cases that year that even cited Chevron. Again, because Cohen and Spitzer’s
case selection method is not explicit, I cannot be sure how they arrived at 13 statutory interpretation cases,
but it seems highly implausible that ten cases raising a Chevron issue would not cite Chevron.
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their description of their methodology46 and the puzzlingly high number of cases in their
dataset relative to my attempt at replication.47 But, not all lawsuits between an agency
and a private party – not even in cases that involve some statutory interpretation issue –
involve the issues of judicial deference to agency action with which the Cohen-Spitzer
hypothesis is concerned. Some such cases, for instance, only raise questions of civil
procedure in federal court,48 attorneys’ fee awards,49 or other issues peripheral to the
question of the validity of agency decisions. I screened out such cases, which may
explain why my case count is considerably lower than Cohen and Spitzer’s for the years
where our samples overlap.
Third, unlike Cohen and Spitzer, in this research project I do not examine denials
of certiorari, nor do I examine patterns of deference at the lower court level in cases
where the Supreme Court did not grant review.50 Therefore, this study does not attempt
to replicate all aspects of Cohen and Spitzer’s original empirical work, but only on those
elements of their analysis that focused on the cases actually decided by the Supreme
Court. I believe that this focus on actually decided cases is substantively justified given
the nature of the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis, which emphasizes the signals that the
Supreme Court sends to lower courts. It seems more plausible that the Supreme Court
would influence lower court decision-making through its express holdings rather than
through patterns of cert grants and cert denials; the former are easily observable by the
lower courts, whereas the latter are not. Therefore, while analysis of lower court
46

See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 456-57.
See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 459 Tab. 3.
48
See, e.g. Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617 (1990) (reviewing whether a district court’s order to the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services was a “final order” sufficient to confer
appellate jurisdiction on the court of appeals, but not reaching the substantive question whether the
Secretary’s determination was legally valid).
49
See, e.g., Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877 (1989) (holding that the Equal Access to Justice Act allows
courts to award attorneys’ fees to a Social Security claimant for representation before an administrative
proceeding following a judicial remand to the Secretary of Health and Human Services).
50
In this sense, my approach in this paper differs from several elements of the Cohen-Spitzer study. See
Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 462-65. Though this difference might explain the
difference in our results, that would be the case only if cert denials sent a stronger signal to lower courts
than would seem plausible.
47
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decision-making patterns and Supreme Court cert decisions would enrich the analysis, the
main hypothesis under investigation can be assessed – at least as a preliminary matter –
by focusing on whether and how the Supreme Court shapes deference doctrine through
the Court’s written opinions.

C. Generating an Annual Deference Signal: Coding and Weighting

1. Coding: Pro-Deference or Anti-Deference?

After identifying the set of cases in which the Supreme Court arguably sent a
message to the lower courts regarding the appropriate level of deference to administrative
agency decisions, the next issue involves how to evaluate and weight the relative strength
of those messages. As a first step, I attempted to classify all cases as pro-deference or
anti-deference. Even this simple approach involves some problematic coding issues,
however.
First, some cases have mixed holdings – that is, the Supreme Court called for
deference to the agency as to one portion of its decision, but refused deference on some
other element of the case. For example, in American Textiles Manufacturing Institute v.
Donovan,51 the Court upheld the Secretary of Labor’s decision not to use cost-benefit
analysis when setting cotton dust standards under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA), but invalidated another OSHA regulation related to wage guarantees for
transferred employees as not supported by a sufficient statement of reasons that this rule
was related to the Act’s health and safety goals. Similarly, the Court in NLRB v. Baptist
Hospital52 upheld one of the challenged National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) rules

51
52

452 U.S. 490 (1981).
442 U.S. 773 (1979).
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relating to union solicitation in hospitals as supported by substantial evidence, but
invalidated a related rule as too sweeping.
Second, the message sent by some cases is ambiguous because, while the Court
upholds the agency action, it does so using language – often cited in future cases – that
seems to stand for the proposition that courts should scrutinize certain types of agency
action quite carefully. For instance, Lyng v. Payne53 upheld a decision by the Farmer’s
Home Association (FmHA) as consistent with the agency’s regulatory requirements, but
noted that an agency’s authority is no greater than that conferred by Congress – a
proposition, cited in a few subsequent cases, that suggests limits on agency discretion.
The opposite can occur as well, and in fact may happen more frequently. For instance, in
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,54 the Court invalidated an NLRB decision as inconsistent with
established precedent, and held further that the stare decisis principle trumped the normal
deference that would be accorded that sort of agency decision. But, though the outcome
of the Lechmere case is anti-deference, the opinion’s language regarding the judicial
deference that NLRB opinions are ordinarily due was cited in several subsequent cases to
support pro-deference outcomes. Relatedly, the Court sometimes upholds an agency
action, and recites standard pro-deference language, yet reaches its conclusion without
according special deference to the agency’s determination. This appears to what
happened in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell,55 where the Court upheld antidiscrimination regulations promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW), and noted that agency interpretations are normally entitled to great
deference, but asserted that the ordinary level of deference was not appropriate in that
particular case.56

53

476 U.S. 926 (1986).
502 U.S. 527 (1992).
55
456 U.S. 512 (1982).
56
Bell, 456 U.S. at 522 n.12.
54
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These potential problems turn out not to be as severe as one might expect,
however. For the overwhelming number of cases in the dataset, the outcome of the
particular case and the most-cited legal propositions articulated in that case point in the
same pro-deference or anti-deference direction. When coding the ambiguous cases, I
adhered to the following principles. First, where one aspect of the holding appeared
considerably more important than the others, I used the deference signal sent on the more
important element of the case. Second, where there were multiple aspects of the Court’s
holding that seemed equally important, but one was cited significantly more often than
the others in subsequent cases, I generally presumed that the more-cited provision was
the more relevant aspect of the Court’s holding. Third, because anti-deference signals are
so much rarer in the data, in close cases I erred on the side of coding mixed or ambiguous
cases as anti-deference if the anti-deference portion of the holding appeared significant.
For a few cases, it was sufficiently difficult to classify the holding as pro- or antideference (i.e., cases where separate portions of the holding that pointed in different
directions, or where the general legal principle that the Court stressed appeared at odds
with the outcome in the particular case) that I could not confidently categorize them;
these cases (only four out of the 221 in the dataset) were assigned a deference score of 0.
My coding decisions obviously involve debatable judgment calls. For that reason, and in
the general interests of transparency, I have listed what I considered to be ambiguous
cases, and my coding decisions, in Appendix B.
Another potentially problematic issue is whether to include those cases that
involve Supreme Court review of state supreme court decisions, direct review of federal
district court decisions, or exercises of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. Since
the main question at issue is the degree to which the Supreme Court influences the
behavior of federal appellate courts, one might reasonably question whether decisions not
involving review of federal appellate court decisions are relevant to the analysis. I
believe that they are. The Supreme Court can communicate its deference doctrine
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through its holdings regardless of which lower court’s decision it is reviewing. Indeed,
fundamental to the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis is the premise that Supreme Court decisions
matter not only to the particular court whose decision is appealed, but more broadly as a
signal of the Court’s preferences to all lower courts. Again, this potential problem turns
out to be marginal in practice, as only fourteen cases in the data set do not involve review
of a federal circuit court decision. These cases are listed in Appendix C, and their
exclusion does not fundamentally affect the results.
There is another difficulty, more significant and more conceptual, with assessing
the overall deference signal that the Supreme Court sends to lower federal courts in any
given year. This is the question of whether the relevant variable is the annual aggregate
deference signal – that is, the total number of pro-deference cases decided in a given year
net the number of anti-deference cases decided in the same year – or the annual average
deference signal – that is, each year’s aggregate deference signal divided by the number
of cases decided that year.
On the one hand, one might suppose that the total number of cases that the Court
chooses to hear is itself an important aspect of the message that it sends to the lower
courts. Thus, a year in which the Court issued nine pro-deference cases and no antideference cases ought to be considered as a year when the Court sent a stronger prodeference signal than the signal the Court sent in a year with three pro-deference cases
and no anti-deference cases. Or, to take a starker example, what if the Court in Year X
decides nine pro-deference cases and one anti-deference case, and in Year Y decides only
one case, but issues a pro-deference holding in that case? Taking the average signal
would suggest a stronger pro-deference signal in Year Y than in Year X (1.0 vs. 0.9), but
that conclusion might seem suspect.
On the other hand, the number of cases per year is small, and a number of other
factors may influence the number of cases on the Court’s docket that happen to raise a
deference issue. Assigning too much weight to the aggregate deference signal may
Stephenson – Judicial Deference Draft 7/13/2004
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obscure the Court’s actual attitude toward the appropriate level of judicial deference to
agency decisions. For instance, suppose in Year X the Court issues two pro-deference
holdings and one anti-deference holding, and in Year Y the Court issues ten prodeference holdings and five anti- deference holdings. Here, the proportion is constant, but
looking at the aggregate signal would suggest that the pro-deference signal in Year Y is
much stronger than in Year X. But if there is enough random fluctuation in the number
of cases, that conclusion might be seriously misleading. Turning from the hypothetical to
the real, the actual number of Supreme Court cases decide per year declined substantially
between 1977 and 2002.57 The aggregate signal is therefore likely to exaggerate the
signal sent in the earlier years of the sample relative to the later years.
The theory of Supreme Court signaling to lower courts is too underdeveloped to
decide conclusively between these alternatives. Cohen and Spitzer approach the problem
by estimating, based on the average number of decided cases, the rate at which the
Supreme Court denied cert in deference cases, and “deflating” the average deference
signal accordingly.58 I take a different approach, reporting both the aggregate deference
signal and the average deference signal.

2. Case Weighting – Three Approaches

a. Equal Weighting

The simplest way to generate an annual deference signal is to add up or average
the pro- and anti-deference cases in each year, and that is the first approach I employ. I
assign a score of +1 to every case where the Supreme Court indicated that deference to

57
58

See infra Table 6 and Figure 14.
See infra note 76.
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administrative agencies was appropriate, and a score of –1 to every case where the
Supreme Court endorsed more aggressive judicial scrutiny of agency decisions.
However, the simple case-counting approach implies a strong and implausible
assumption: that every case that the Supreme Court decides sends just as strong a signal
to the lower courts as every other case. This leads to some bizarre coding results.
According to the simple case-counting approach, Chevron v. NRDC59 and Community
Television of Southern California v. Gottfried60 both get a “+1” pro-deference score, even
though the former is perhaps the most significant and widely-cited administrative law
decision of the last century, while the latter stands only for a relatively obscure
proposition about Federal Communications Commission (FCC) licensing authority. This
problem raises serious questions about the validity of any results derived using an equalweighting method. Unfortunately, there is no easy, objective way to validly and reliably
weight Supreme Court cases by their importance, i.e. their subsequent influence on the
decisions of lower courts. But, measures more refined than the simple case-counting
method are possible. I therefore employ, in addition to the equal-weighting approach,
two alternative weighting methods. First, I follow Cohen and Spitzer’s method of
weighting Supreme Court reversals more heavily than affirmances. Second, I develop an
alternative, and I believe superior, method of weighting cases by their influence,
measured as a function of citations per month.

b. The Cohen-Spitzer Method: Double-Weighting
Reversals

Cohen and Spitzer weight those cases where the Supreme Court reverses a lower
court decision twice as heavily as cases where the Supreme Court affirms the lower court.
59
60

467 U.S. 837 (1984).
459 U.S. 498 (1983).
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Thus, if the lower court did not defer to the agency but the Supreme Court reversed, the
case is coded as a “+2”, but if the lower court deferred and the Supreme Court affirms,
the case is coded as a “+1”.61 The rationale is that lower court judges don’t like getting
reversed, and so they treat reversals as more salient signals.62
The evidence that lower court judges don’t like to be reversed notwithstanding,
the assumption that reversals send a signal twice as strong as affirmances is problematic.
The key dynamic involved in the theoretical framework Cohen and Spitzer elaborate is
the signal that a Supreme Court decision sends to all lower courts. Even if judges are
particularly averse to having their own decisions overturned, it’s not clear why the signal
sent by the Supreme Court in a given case to other lower courts depends on whether the
lower court in that case got reversed. In fact, there is at least a plausible argument that,
because most of the cases that the Supreme Court takes are cases it wants to reverse,63
affirmances may send an especially strong signal. After all, why would the Supreme
Court grant cert to a case that it views as correctly decided, if not to signal to other courts
the proper resolution of a particular legal issue?
Even if one thinks that reversals are, on average, stronger signals than
affirmances, the Cohen-Spitzer weighting system is still not entirely satisfactory. First,
the choice of a 2:1 ratio of signal strength is an arbitrary but potentially potent
assumption. Why not 3:1? Or 1.5:1? Because the methodology involves counting cases,
these numbers have cardinal as opposed to purely ordinal meaning, and the results are not
likely to be robust to alternative weightings. Also, this weighting system still doesn’t
61

See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 464.
See Thomas J. Miceli & Metin M. Cosgel, Reputation and Judicial Decision-Making, J. ECON. BEHAV.
& ORG. 23 (1994); Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Private and Public Judges, 41 PUB. CHOICE 107,
128-32 (1983). But see Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, Judicial Discretion, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 129
(1980).
63
See John F. Krol & Saul Brenner, Strategies in Certioriari Voting on the United States Supreme Court: A
Reevaluation, 43 W. POL. Q. 335 (1990). Reversals were indeed more common than affirmances in my
sample of 221 cases, though not by as much as one might expect. Of the 221 cases, 132 (59.7%) were
coded as reversals, 87 (39.4%) were affirmances, and two (0.9%) involved a sufficiently divided holding
that they could not be satisfactorily classified as either, and so were given a score of 0 under this weighting
methodology.
62
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address the problem illustrated by the Chevron/Gottfried comparison noted above.64
Nonetheless, while I am skeptical of the Cohen-Spitzer emphasis on whether the
Supreme Court decision was a reversal or an affirmance, in the interests of comparability
I code all the cases in the sample using this methodology. For some cases, the Supreme
Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, and both parts of the decision were either proor anti-deference. Cohen and Spitzer’s discussion of their methodology does not explain
how they coded such cases. Because of the emphasis on the scariness to lower courts of
any reversal implied by the weighting theory, I coded these cases as reversals.

c. Citation-Weighted Influence Scores

An alternative approach to weighting the cases in the sample is to use citation
counts as a proxy for influence. Such an approach is obviously imperfect, especially
since simple citation counts don’t reveal whether a given citing case relies on the cited
case for the outcome-determinative legal test, or whether the cited case is merely listed in
a string cite buried in a footnote.65 Nonetheless, citation counts are a reasonable proxy
for case influence and importance.
I weight each case in the sample by multiplying its raw deference score (+1 or –1)
by an “influence factor.” I calculate the influence factor by, first, finding the Westlaw
KeyCite headnote for each case that most closely corresponds to the deference signal. If
multiple headnotes appeared relevant, I chose the one for which the case was more often
cited. I then used Westlaw’s “Most Cited Cases” function to count the number of times
the case had been cited for the relevant proposition by federal courts of appeal as of
December 26, 2002. The “influence function” for each case is a function of the number
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See supra TAN 59-60.
It would be theoretically possible, but far too time consuming, to check the context of each case citation.
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of citations and the number of months since the case was decided.66 The 221 cases in the
sample ranged from a maximum influence factor of 4.85 (Chevron), to a minimum of
0.14 (Mohasco Corp. v. Silver67), with a mean value of 1.94 and a median of 1.88.
A cursory scan of the cases ranked by their influence factor (provided in
Appendix D) suggests that this measure is generally consistent with legal scholars’
intuitions about which of the Supreme Court’s administrative law decisions have been
most important. According to this weighting technique, the top five most influential
cases out of the 221 in the sample are, in descending order of influence, Chevron, Motor
Vehicles Manufacturer’s Association v. State Farm,68 Heckler v. Campbell,69 Bowen v.
Georgetown University Hospital,70 and INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca.71 The weighting
system also seems to do a reasonably good job in assigning high scores both to influential
recent cases – Christensen v. Harris County72 and U.S. v. Mead73 rank 21st and 35th with
respective influence factors of 3.48 and 2.94 – and to influential older cases – Vermont
Yankee v. NRDC,74 for instance, comes in 32nd on the list with a score of 3.02.
The influence-weighted scores, for all their imperfections, thus seem to offer
distinct advantages over weighting cases by whether they were affirmances or reversals,
or counting all cases equally. Nonetheless, I consider all six measures of deference signal

66

The precise influence function calculation is

(

)

f (c, m) = ln 1 + 1+1ln(+ cm ) , where c is the total number of

citations and m is the total number of months. I add one to the citation count in the numerator because
otherwise recent cases with no citations would be counted as having zero influence. I use a natural log
function of months in the denominator of the fraction inside the parentheses because of the assumption that
cases are cited frequently in the few years after they are first decided, but (with a few exceptions) less
frequently in the more distant future. A straight division would therefore underweight the influence that
older cases had in their immediate aftermath. I take the natural log of the whole function inside the
parentheses because I assume a decreasing marginal significance of additional case citations.
67
447 U.S. 807) (1980).
68
463 U.S. 29 (1983).
69
461 U.S. 458 (1983).
70
488 U.S. 204 (1988).
71
480 U.S. 421 (1987).
72
529 U.S. 576 (2000).
73
533 U.S. 218 (2001).
74
435 U.S. 519 (1979).
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strength (aggregate and average yearly scores for each of the three weighting methods) in
the subsequent analysis.

III.

Results

Following the various coding and weighting methodologies described above, I
assess the trends in judicial deference doctrine for the 1977-2002 period. This simple
empirical analysis, like the original Cohen and Spitzer papers, does not attempt to control
for other factors. This is not only because such an analysis would be methodologically
difficult given the nature of the problem and the small number of cases, but also because
the Cohen-Spitzer result under investigation is not merely a marginal comparative statics
hypothesis, but rather a strong claim that observable trends in deference doctrine can be
predicted solely from relative political alignments of courts and agencies.
The results are somewhat surprising. First, the patterns of deference doctrine in
the Supreme Court’s decisions do not seem to match what Cohen and Spitzer’s rational
choice theory predicts. Although the patterns in the 1977-1990 period are roughly
consistent with the theory, even here there are some significant differences between the
data Cohen and Spitzer report and what I find. In particular, in terms of aggregate
deference signal, I find high degrees of deference demanded in the late 1970s under
Carter, whereas Cohen and Spitzer found relatively low levels.
Much more importantly, I find no evidence that the Supreme Court signaled a
contraction of deference doctrine in the early to mid-1990s, as the Cohen-Spitzer theory
would predict. Quite the opposite. Though the trend is not completely clear – and shows
a worrying lack of robustness to different specifications – most versions of the data seem
to indicate a significant spike in the average level of judicial deference called for by the
Supreme Court from about 1993-94 to about 1996-97, and then a relatively steady decline
until 2000. These results are hard to square with the Cohen-Spitzer theory, since the
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conservative Supreme Court appears to be shifting power from relatively conservative
appellate judges to Clinton’s more liberal executive agencies.
Also contrary to Cohen and Spitzer’s results, I find do not find the predicted
difference between the Supreme Court’s treatment of executive and independent
agencies. Though the independent agencies tended to receive less deference throughout
the sample period, this was the case not only under Reagan (where the Cohen-Spitzer
theory would predict such a difference) but also under Clinton (where the Cohen-Spitzer
theory would predict the opposite). Nor did investigation of whether the Court treated
appeals from liberal circuits differently than appeals from conservative circuits yield any
discernable distinctions. In those years when the mix of cases was sufficient to allow a
comparison, the Court appeared to send a very similar deference signal in cases from
both liberal and conservative circuits. This additional evidence casts further doubt on
Cohen and Spitzer’s political explanation for changing patterns of deference doctrine.
However, consistent with the Cohen-Spitzer theory, I do find noticeable
differences, of the sort the theory would predict, in the voting patterns of the conservative
Chief Justice Rehnquist and the liberal Justice Stevens, both of whom were on the Court
throughout the entire sample period. Rehnquist was more prone than Stevens to take a
pro-deference line when Reagan was in office, but during the Clinton years Rehnquist
was considerably lesslikely to defer to agencies than Stevens. However, though these
results suggest that something like the Cohen-Spitzer theory may have some influence on
justices’ voting behavior, that influence appears more marginal than Cohen and Spitzer’s
earlier results implied. Stevens and Rehnquist diverged in the predicted manner, but this
divergence occurred in barely more than a third of the cases in the sample; Cohen and
Spitzer’s predicted effect is likely to be even more muted with respect to the more
centrist swing justices.
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A. Changes in the Court’s Deference Signal, 1977-2002
Recall that Cohen and Spitzer claim that their data, weighted according to their
method, shows relatively low deference signals in the late 1970s, then a spike in the early
to mid-1980s – where the Court appeared to send much stronger pro-deference signals –
then a decline in the late 1980s. They interpret this pattern as the result of a conservative
Supreme Court’s reaction to the rightward shift of the agencies in the early 1980s. The
Court reined in the more liberal appellate courts by issuing a series of strongly prodeference rulings, but once equilibrium was restored, the overall deference signal
reverted to more or less where it had been before.75
Below I present graphically the results of my attempt to replicate and extend
Cohen and Spitzer’s analysis.76 Figure 7 shows the results, for the 1977-2002 period,
75

Cite Cohen Spitzer paper. As noted above, supra TAN 15, Cohen and Spitzer rightly stress that the
variable of interest is not the absolute magnitude of the Supreme Court’s deference signal, but rather the
change in that signal over time. In equilibrium, circuit court judges will take the Supreme Court’s
preference into account when deciding cases – i.e., circuit judges will consider their utility from deciding
the case the way they want, their disutility from being reversed (and from deviating from announced
Supreme Court doctrine), and the probability that the Supreme Court will reverse their decision. When the
Supreme Court’s preferred level of deference is known, therefore, circuit court judges will adjust their
behavior, and the absolute deference signal, whatever it may be, will remain relatively constant. This
phenomenon is closely related to the well-known finding that changes in the underlying liability standard
have no long-term effect on plaintiff win-rates at trial, because the parties adjust their behavior to take the
new standard into account. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J.L. STUD. 1 (1984).
If litigants and circuit court judges could anticipate and perfectly adjust to changes in Supreme Court
preferences with regard to the appropriate level of deference to agencies, then shifts in Supreme Court
deference doctrine would never have an observable effect on the deference signal contained in the cases the
Court actually decides. However, such perfect and instantaneous adjustment is unlikely in the real world,
for a few reasons. First, appeals sometimes take some time to get through the system, so that some appeals
may be decided before a shift in Supreme Court doctrine has become clear. (However, as Cohen and
Spitzer note, in the kinds of public law cases at issue here, the appeals process is often much more rapid
than it is in other contexts. See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 460 n.60.) Second, if
circuit courts are uncertain about whether a particular Supreme Court case (or set of cases) really represents
a shift in deference doctrine, the circuit courts’ estimate of the Supreme Court’s preferred deference level
will be somewhere in between the old standard and the new one. This means that circuit court decisions
will shift, but, at least initially, will not shift enough to satisfy the Supreme Court
Therefore, when the Supreme Court changes deference doctrine, the pattern of case decisions is expected
to be a sustained directional shift in the deference signal for some period of time, until the lower courts
have internalized the new standard, after which the average deference signal ought to return to its “natural”
equilibrium level.
76
However, as noted above, this is not an exact replication, for two reasons. First, Cohen and Spitzer
weight their deference signals with a certain number of cert denials, coded as 0. That is, they use the
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when using the aggregate reversal-weighted annual deference score, while Figure 8 uses
the average reversal-weighted deference score. Of the versions of the analysis that I
present, these are is the one that seeks to replicate, as faithfully as possible, Cohen and
Spitzer’s original case-weighting methodology.
[Figure 7 about here]
[Figure 8 about here]
The results in Figure 7 do not look much like what Cohen and Spitzer report, nor
do they appear terribly consistent with the theory. For instance, there is a sharp prodeference spike in 1978, approximately equal in magnitude to the strong pro-deference
signal of 1981. Even more puzzling, there is a two-year decline in the strength of the
deference signal from 1981 to 1983, exactly the period where Cohen and Spitzer’s
theory, and the data they report, say we should see a progressively stronger deference
signal. Overall, though the deference signal post-1990 seems on average weaker than the
pre-1990 deference signal, there is no clearly discernible pattern or trend in the data
sufficient to support any strong conclusions about changing patterns of deference
doctrine.
Figure 8, showing the average (as opposed to aggregate) deference score, also
reveals no clear pattern. The average deference signal appears somewhat more volatile
after 1989 than beforehand, and there appears to be a significant dip in the 1989-1992
period, but otherwise there is no indication of systematic changes in deference doctrine.

average deference signal, but “deflate” it by assuming a constant number of certiorari “slots” per year.
Those slots that are not filled – because the total number of cases decided is less than the number of slots –
are assigned a value of 0 when taking the average. Instead of following this method, I show the aggregate
and average deference scores separately. However, in the interests of greater comparability, I also
calculated the average deference score “deflated” by presumed cert denials. Here I use the maximum
number of cases decided in any year in my sample – 16 – as the ceiling. (Cohen and Spitzer instead use
two standard deviations above the average number of cases decided per year, but because, as they note, this
ceiling is never exceeded in the actual sample, the choice of ceiling makes no difference except with
respect to the (already arbitrary) absolute magnitude of the signal values.) Figure 9 compares the average
deference score – using the Cohen-Spitzer weighting scheme – with the deference score when the values
are “deflated” by dividing the aggregate signal not by the number of cases decided, but by 16 – the
maximum number of cases decided in any given year.
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[Figure 9 about here]
The inconsistency of Cohen and Spitzer’s findings with my attempt at replication
is puzzling. Clearly, the difference in results arises from differences in what we chose to
include in our sample, and in the differences in signal aggregation methodology.
However, because Cohen and Spitzer’s data is not publicly available, I cannot ascertain
the exact reasons for this divergence.
I next consider the annual deference score when applying the unweighted and
influence-weighted methods. These results are presented graphically in Figure 10 and
Figure 11. Figure 10 presents the results for the aggregate score, while Figure 11
presents the average annual deference signal.
[Figure 10 about here]
[Figure 11 about here]
The unweighted scores do not reveal any particularly striking patterns. However,
the influence-weighted scores do suggest some potentially interesting trends. First,
although there is a lot of noise in the data, the annual aggregate influence-weighted score
– like the aggregate reversal-weighted score – appears to show a stronger pro-deference
signal in the 1977-1988 period than in the 1989-2002 period. Second, and perhaps most
interestingly, the average annual influence-weighted deference score suggests the
following pattern: a decline in the late 1970s, an increase from about 1981 to about 1985,
a decrease from 1985 to 1990, another increase from 1990 to about 1995, and then
another decrease from 1995 to 2001. These two patterns – a drop and level-off in the
aggregate deference signal, and a “double hump” in the average deference signal, are
somewhat easier to see by taking a multi-year moving average of the influence-weighted
deference signal. Two- and four-year moving averages are depicted for the aggregate and
average influence-weighted deference signals in Figure 12 and Figure 13.
[Figure 12 about here]
[Figure 13 about here]
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The drop and level-off in the aggregate deference signal may have more to do
with a decline in the total number of cases heard by the Supreme Court than anything
else. As Table 6 and Figure 14 demonstrate, the number of cases heard by the Court each
Term has dropped substantially. Any methodology that implicitly presumes a roughly
constant number of potential slots on the Court’s docket, as both the aggregate signal
method and Cohen and Spitzer’s deflation method do, is therefore likely to exaggerate the
strength of the signal in the early years in the sample relative to the later years.
[Table 6 about here]
[Figure 14 about here]
The “double hump” evident in the average deference signal is therefore the more
interesting and intriguing pattern in the data, and potential explanations for this
phenomenon will be considered below.77 More generally, both the aggregate and average
deference signals that I find are fundamentally inconsistent with Cohen and Spitzer’s
theory, and their own predictions about patterns of deference doctrine in the Clinton
years.

B. Additional Tests: Different Agencies, Different Circuits, Different
Justices

1. Executive agencies vs. Independent Agencies

According to the Cohen-Spitzer theory, politically-motivated changes in Supreme
Court deference doctrine ought to be more pronounced with respect to executive branch
agencies than with respect to independent agencies. The reason, as Cohen and Spitzer
explain, is that executive branch agencies are more responsive to the political ideology of

77

See infra Part IV.B.
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the president than are the independent agencies, which tend to be more insulated.78 Thus,
in the early to mid-1980s, the theory would predict that the Supreme Court would send
stronger pro-deference signals where executive agencies were involved; the prodeference stance vis-à-vis independent agencies ought to be (relatively) weaker. This is
what Cohen and Spitzer claim to find in the data.79 Moreover, in the Clinton years,
Cohen and Spitzer’s predicted contraction of deference doctrine ought to manifest itself
primarily in cases involving executive agencies.
Before proceeding to the empirical results, it’s worth noting a potential theoretical
problem with this prediction. The doctrinal formulations in most of the cases under
consideration are not specific to one type of agency or another. Legal principles and tests
established in cases involving executive agencies are frequently applied in subsequent
cases involving independent agencies, and vice versa. For example, Verizon v. FCC80
raised an issue of how much deference was due the FCC, an independent agency, but the
case relied on the framework established by Chevron, which involved deference to an
executive agency – the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). And, the Vermont
Yankee case involved judicial review of the decisions of an independent agency – the
Atomic Energy Commission – but the important principle established by Vermont Yankee
(that federal courts may not impose procedural requirements on agencies beyond those
established by the Administrative Procedure Act) was subsequently cited in numerous
cases involving executive agencies.81 Inasmuch as the Cohen-Spitzer theory stresses the
signals the Supreme Court sends to lower courts about how circuit judges ought to
resolve future cases, the hypothesis of a significant difference between how the Supreme
Court treats executive agencies and independent agencies turns on an implicit and
78

See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 447, 450-51.
See Cohen & Spitzer, Judicial Deference, supra note 6, at 460-66.
80
535 U.S. 467 (2002).
81
See, e.g., Gonzalez-Oropeza v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 321 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2003) (applying Vermont
Yankee to INS); Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. U.S. EPA, 35 F.3d 600, 606 (1st Cir. 1994)
(applying Vermont Yankee to EPA); Guitard v. U.S. Sec. of Navy, 967 F.2d 737, 742 (2nd Cir. 1992)
(applying Vermont Yankee to Navy).
79
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contestable proposition that the lower courts can discern different standards applied to
each by the Supreme Court, even when the Court does not make such discrimination
explicit.
In order to test the hypothesis that changes in Supreme Court deference doctrine
manifest themselves primarily in cases involving executive agencies, I bifurcated my
sample into two groups based on the status of the agency involved. Of the 221 cases in
the sample, 125 involved executive agencies, and the other 96 involved independent
agencies. Using the influence-weighted deference scores – which, for reasons described
above, I believe are the most reliable – I calculated the annual aggregate and average
deference scores.82 These are depicted below in Figure 15 and Figure 16.
[Figure 15 about here]
[Figure 16 about here]
These figures provide little support for the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis that their
rational choice theory of deference doctrine obtains primarily with respect to executive
agencies, and is more muted with respect to independent agencies. It is true that the level
of deference (both aggregate and average) accorded executive agencies was greater than
that accorded independent agencies in 1983-1986. However, in 1981-1982, the average
deference signal was actually greater for independent agencies than executive agencies,
contrary to what the theory would predict. More importantly, in the Clinton years the
deference signal associated with cases involving executive agencies was also consistently
stronger than the deference signal associated with independent agency cases. Indeed, the
results suggest that the overall pattern of change in deference doctrine observed in the
Clinton years is driven primarily by cases demanding greater deference to executive
agencies – in stark contrast to what the Cohen-Spitzer theory would predict.

82

Though I only report the influence-weighted score results, I checked the unweighted and reversalweighted annual and aggregate scores as well. No significant patterns appeared.
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The finding that, on the whole, the Court appears to accord less deference in cases
involving independent agencies than it does in cases involving executive agencies may
seem counterintuitive. After all, independent agencies are presumably more ideologically
moderate than agencies under the president’s control, and thus courts might be expected
to be more aggressive when reviewing executive agency action and more deferential to
the independent commissions. There are several possible reasons why the opposite
appears to be the case.
First, the apparent “independent agency effect” (i.e., lower average deference in
independent agency cases) may arise from the subject matter of the independent agency
cases – in particular, it may have to do with labor and employment law. Over one-third
of the independent agency cases in the sample (33 of 96) involved either the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) (27 cases) or the Federal Labor Relations Authority
(FLRA) (six cases). The second- and third-place independent agencies, by total number
of cases raising a deference issue, were the FCC (16 cases) and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) (11 cases); no other independent agency appears in the
data set more than six times. Therefore, if there is something about labor and
employment law cases – either in terms of their politics or the doctrinal posture in which
deference issues tend to arise in such cases – that is conducive to lower levels of judicial
deference, the apparent “independent agency effect” may in fact be a “labor law effect.”83

83

According to Elizabeth Garrett, a number of scholars have “noted that the National Labor Relations
Board seems to be given less deference [than other agencies], in part because of its preference to make
policy through adjudication and not rulemaking but also because its reputation makes it suspect in some
quarters.” Elizabeth Garret, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH L. REV. ??, ?? (2003). Interestingly, decisions
involving agencies that deal with employees’ rights (both individually and collectively) appear to get less
judicial deference than other agency decisions, independent of whether the agencies are independent or
under presidential control. Of the agencies in the sample, seven were involved in ten or more Supreme
Court cases in which the Court sent a signal as to the appropriate level of judicial deference – HHS/HEW,
EPA (and Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)), FCC, Treasury, NLRB, EEOC, and Labor (including
OSHA and OWCP). The proportion of cases in which the Court sent a pro-deference signal for each of
these agencies are: 82.8% for HHS (24 of 29 cases); 80% for EPA (8 of 10 cases); 76.9% for FCC (10 of
13 cases); 71.4% for Treasury (10 of 14 cases); 61.5% for NLRB (16 of 26 cases); 50% for EEOC (6 of 12
cases); and 38.5% for Labor (5 of 13 cases).
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Another potential explanation, explored in greater detail below,84 is that lower
courts tend systematically to underestimate the amount of deference that they ought to
accord to new presidential initiatives. That is, it may be that when new presidents pursue
dramatic policy changes through executive agency decisions, lower courts are too quick
(from the Supreme Court’s point of view) to invalidate those actions. In contrast, lower
courts may be better at estimating the appropriate level of deference due to independent
agencies, and so the Supreme Court need not send as many strong pro-deference signals.
On this point, note that the data showing a consistently weaker pro-deference signal in
independent agency cases does not necessarily indicate that the Supreme Court wants the
circuit courts to apply a lower absolute level of scrutiny to independent agencies than to
executive agencies. Instead, the argument is that lower courts are better at estimating and
applying the appropriate level of deference to independent agencies, and therefore strong
signals from the Supreme Court are not as necessary.
Whatever the explanation, the results regarding executive and independent
agencies suggest that Cohen and Spitzer’s finding that the deference spike in the early
1980s was considerably more pronounced with respect to executive agencies than
independent agencies, even if an accurate as an empirical matter, does not necessarily
support their explanation for changes in Supreme Court deference doctrine. Instead, it
appears that pro-deference signals in independent agency cases are generally weaker
throughout the sample period, and the spike in deference during the Clinton years – the
strongest empirical evidence against the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis – is actually stronger
when only executive agency cases are considered.

2. Circuit Court Ideology

84

See infra Part IV.B.1.
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As discussed above, although there are general national trends in the ideological
composition of the federal appellate bench, there is considerably inter-circuit ideological
variation as well.85 Therefore, it may be that the Supreme Court sends different signals
about the appropriate level of judicial deference to different circuits. In particular, a
hypothesis consistent with the Cohen-Spitzer theory – though not a hypothesis advanced
by Cohen and Spitzer themselves – is that a conservative Supreme Court in a Republican
administration will send stronger pro-deference signals in cases from liberal circuits than
it will in cases from conservative circuits, while under a Democratic administration a
conservative Supreme Court will send stronger anti-deference signals to the conservative
circuits. Thus, the hypothesis would predict that the Supreme Court should send stronger
pro-deference signals to liberal courts than conservative courts throughout the sample
period.
This hypothesis makes a number of assumptions. First, as seems likely, the
ideological predilections of the different circuits must be known both to the judges on the
different circuits and to the justices of the Supreme Court. Second, the hypothesis
assumes not only that the Supreme Court’s doctrinal pronouncements, though
purportedly universal, vary depending on the lower court’s political leanings, but also
that lower court judges are sensitive enough to this phenomenon to react more markedly
to a pro- or anti-deference signal sent to the judge’s own circuit, or to an ideologically
similar circuits, than to a circuit on the opposite end of the political spectrum.
To test the hypothesis that the ideology of the circuit of origin makes a difference,
I subdivided the original 221 cases into those decisions involving a “liberal” circuit
(defined as a circuit with a mean judicial ideology score of -0.1 or below), those
involving a “conservative” circuit (mean judicial ideology of 0.1 or above), and those
involving either a moderate circuit, a district court, a state supreme court, or Supreme

85

See supra TAN 27.
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Court original jurisdiction. Of the 221 cases in the original sample, 96 (43.4%) reviewed
a decision by a liberal circuit, 59 (26.7%) reviewed a conservative circuit decision, and
the remaining 66 (29.9%) fell into the residual category.
Unfortunately (at least from a research perspective), the liberal and conservative
circuit court cases cluster in different time periods. For instance, none of the circuit
courts were conservative (by my calculation) until the mid-1980s, and so the first review
of a conservative circuit’s decision on a judicial deference issue does not appear until
1985. Similarly, no circuit other than the 11th Circuit was liberal from 1990 to 1996, and
so no liberal circuit cases appear in the sample in the 1991-1995 period. I therefore
concentrate on the deference signal sent in those years in the sample when there was the
most inter-circuit ideological variation – 1985-1991 and 1996-2002. This is obviously
problematic, since the two most important transition periods – Reagan and Clinton’s first
terms – are omitted. Nonetheless, the data are suggestive, and provides little support for
the hypothesis that the Supreme Court treats liberal and conservative circuits differently.
As Figure 21 and Figure 22 demonstrate, the average deference signal sent by the
Court to liberal and conservative circuits tends to track almost exactly.86 Moreover,
precisely because there were hardly any liberal circuit court decisions to review in the
1991-1995 period, the spike in judicial deference during that period is partially
attributable to pro-deference signals sent to conservative circuits, in apparent
contradiction to the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis. Figure 23 confirms that the Supreme
Court sent strong pro-deference signals, with a generally increasing trend, to conservative
circuits throughout the 1990s. The Supreme Court only shifted to signaling less
deference to agencies after the election of George W. Bush – again exactly the opposite
of what the Cohen-Spitzer theory predicts.

86

Supreme Court appears to send somewhat different signals is 1997-1998, but this result may be driven by
a single case, Dunn v. CFTC. This case was the only one in the 1997-1998 period that involved an appeal
from a liberal circuit, and it called for less judicial deference.
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[Figure 21 about here]
[Figure 22 about here]
[Figure 23 about here]

3. Individual Justices: Stevens vs. Rehnquist

The preceding attempts to reproduce and extend Cohen and Spitzer’s test of their
rational choice theory of judicial deference yielded results apparently inconsistent with
that theory. The relatively high levels of deference conferred on Carter-era
administrative agencies make the pro-deference cases decided in the early 1980s seem
like less of a dramatic shift in deference doctrine than the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis
implied. And, under Clinton, the level of deference called for by the Supreme Court
appears to have expanded (or at least held steady), in apparent contradiction of the
Cohen-Spitzer rational choice model’s prediction.
However, even if the predicted effect is not apparent with respect to the Court’s
collective decisions, it may be discernable in the votes of individual justices. That is, it
may be that the swing voters on the Court (e.g., Stewart, Powell, O’Connor, Kennedy)
are sufficiently centrist that political calculations of the sort Cohen and Spitzer describe
have little or no influence on their votes, but that the more ideologically extreme
members of the Court are likely, as per the Cohen-Spitzer theory, to vote to expand
deference doctrine when the circuit courts are less politically congenial than the agencies,
and to contract deference doctrine when the situation is reversed.
I conduct a preliminary test of this alternative version of the hypothesis by
looking at the difference in voting patterns of Justice Stevens and Chief Justice
Rehnquist. Both of these justices were on the Court throughout the entire sample period,
and they are generally considered to occupy opposite ends of the ideological spectrum.
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The Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis would predict that the conservative Chief Justice
Rehnquist would be more likely than the liberal Justice Stevens to call for greater judicial
deference to agency decisions during the Reagan and Bush administrations, but more
likely to call for more aggressive judicial scrutiny of agency decisions under Carter and
Clinton.
In order to evaluate this hypothesis, I examined a subset of the original dataset
containing only those cases in which Justices Stevens and Rehnquist reached different
conclusions about the degree of deference due to an administrative agency.87 Of the
original 221 cases, 80 (36.2%) involved significant differences of opinion between
Rehnquist and Stevens on the deference question. These 80 cases, along with how each
of the two justices voted on the deference issue, are listed in Appendix E. Using the
citation-weighting methodology described above, I calculated Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
average influence-weighted deference signal, using only the cases where he and Justice
Stevens disagreed, for each of the 26 years in the sample.88 This value represents the
difference between Justice Rehnquist’s pro-deference signal and Justice Stevens’ prodeference signal, with positive numbers indicating that, in the cases where they diverged,
Rehnquist was more likely to call for high levels of deference than Stevens, and negative
numbers indicating that Stevens was the more deferential of the two.
In contrast to the results for the Court as a whole, the results of a comparison of
Stevens and Rehnquist are strongly supportive of the Cohen-Spitzer rational choice
hypothesis. As is clear from Figure 24, Figure 25, and Figure 26 below – which show,
87

For the most part, these cases are those in which one of the two justices joins the majority while the other
one dissents. However, in some cases on of the two concurred but resolved the deference issue differently.
These cases were included in the set of cases where the two diverged. In other cases the dissenting justice
dissented on some point unrelated to the deference issue; these cases where not included in the subset of
divergent cases.
88
Where Rehnquist dissented on the deference issue, I reversed the sign on the influence score that the case
otherwise would have received. So, for example, US v. O’Hagan (1997) (with Justice Stevens in the
majority) came out pro-deference with an citation-weighted influence factor of 0.456. Since Rehnquist was
in dissent, I assign the case a value of –0.456 when calculating the pro-deference signal of Rehnquist’s
voting behavior.
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respectively, the annual, two-year, and four-year average difference between Rehnquist’s
and Stevens’ influence-weighted deference signal – Rehnquist consistently voted for
more deference than Stevens from about 1979-1987, and Stevens consistently voted for
more deference than Rehnquist from about 1994-2000.89

[Figure 24 about here]
[Figure 25 about here]
[Figure 26 about here]

Though these results are consistent with the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis, their
strength as evidence is mitigated by a number of considerations. First, as noted above,
Rehnquist and Stevens disagreed in only about a third of the cases in the sample, meaning
that even for relatively more extreme judges, the hypothesized effect is small. For the
more centrist swing voters, the effect is likely to be even weaker. Second, Rehnquist and
Stevens may not be representative of conservative and liberal justices more generally; a
more thorough assessment will require the examination of the votes of other justices,
beyond the scope of this study. Third, Rehnquist and Stevens may simply be voting on
individual case outcomes, rather than broader issues of appropriate deference. That is,
Rehnquist may vote the pro-deference line in the 1980s because the cases that come up
involve conservative agencies doing conservative things, but he votes anti-deference in
the 1990s because the cases involve liberal agency policy choices.90

IV.

Discussion

89

The pattern in the 1988-1993 period, and in 2001-2002, is more ambiguous.
Indeed, one might make this point more broadly about Cohen and Spitzer’s results. The best way to test
the hypothesis would be to find cases where the agency action under review was ideologically divergent
from the norm. Such additional tests would be extremely valuable, but they are beyond the scope of the
present study.

90
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A. Accounting for a Null Finding

The analysis above yields few clear-cut conclusions. Indeed, the strongest result
is a null finding – I generally do not observe the patterns that Cohen and Spitzer predict,
especially in the period outside their original sample. Moreover, there is a great deal of
“noise” in the results, and considerable inconsistency between different techniques for
measuring the strength of the deference signal in different years. This lack of robustness
further calls Cohen and Spitzer’s original findings into question.
One possible explanation of these null findings is that the Cohen-Spitzer
hypothesis – that shifting Supreme Court-circuit court- administrative agency ideological
alignments influence deference doctrine because the Supreme Court seeks to maximize
its policy satisfaction – though logical, parsimonious, and intuitively appealing in many
respects, is simply incorrect as an empirical matter. The Supreme Court’s deference
doctrine may instead be determined by other factors, it may reflect normative or doctrinal
commitments independent of short-term policy results, or it may be as confused and
inconsistent as some observers have charged. Thus, the null finding reported here may be
useful inasmuch as it might prompt additional research – especially by legal scholars
interested in social scientific analysis of judicial behavior – into alternative explanations
for the Supreme Court’s decisions on cases that raise issues of judicial deference to
administrative agencies.91
Another possibility is that the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis is basically correct, but
the postulated effect cannot be observed by looking at the simple trend lines that Cohen
and Spitzer and I report. There are at least three reasons why this might be the case.
First, the predicted patterns may not be discernible because of methodological errors in
91

It is worth stressing that such a conclusion would not necessarily entail a rejection of applying rational
choice theory to Supreme Court decision-making as such. Rather, it may be that the rational choice
framework remains the most useful approach to analyzing Court behavior, but presumptions about judicial
utility functions and institutional context must be re-examined.
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sample selection and measurement. While I have endeavored to explain as clearly as
possible the rationale and justification for my decisions on these methodology issues,
other scholars may find my choices problematic. I therefore leave open the possibility
that the predicted effect does not emerge because I have not correctly calculated the
Court’s deference signal, though this possibility seems to me an unlikely explanation for
the apparent lack of confirmation of the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis.92
Second, recall that the deference signal sent by the Supreme Court should be
relatively constant in equilibrium because Supreme Court preferences are anticipated by
litigants and lower court judges, who adjust their behavior accordingly. Both Cohen and
Spitzer and I assume that this adjustment will not be instantaneous, and that there will
therefore be a period of a few years when the Supreme Court will have to intensify its
signals in one direction or another in order to induce the return to equilibrium. But it is
theoretically possible that the lower court’s adjustment occurs instantaneously, or at least
sufficiently quickly that no clear Supreme Court signal is observable in data of the sort
examined here.93
Third, it might be the case that political calculations of the sort Cohen and Spitzer
hypothesize are only one influence among many, and so cannot be detected by looking at
simple trends in the deference signal independent of other potentially important variables.
Neither Cohen and Spitzer’s original studies, nor my attempts at re-evaluation and
extension, perform a multivariate analysis that controls for other potential influences on
Supreme Court deference doctrine. The main reason for this is that the hypothesis as
92

Another type of measurement problem may arise if my assumptions about agency ideology, circuit court
ideology, and Supreme Court ideology are incorrect. For instance, agencies may be more responsive to
congressional control than presidential control, or their behavior may be relatively insensitive to changes in
presidential administration. Or, the measurement of circuit court ideology may be sufficiently inaccurate
that, contrary to my assumptions, the circuit courts were not much more liberal in the 1980s than they were
in the 1990s. These possibilities seem highly unlikely, but they cannot be ruled out entirely.
93
It is also possible that lower courts might over-estimate as well as under-estimate the amount of change
in deference doctrine the Supreme Court desires. This could further confound the results, in that increases
in deference doctrine might actually indicate a period when the Court wants less deference than it did in an
earlier period. However, though such overreactions are conceptually possible, they seem unlikely.
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originally advanced by Cohen and Spitzer implied that the effect would be strong enough
to determine the pattern of Supreme Court deference doctrine without controlling for
other variables. It may be the case that such a prediction grossly exaggerated the strength
of the predicted effect, but that the hypothesized influence of political alignments is
nonetheless valid at the margins, and would be observable through a more rigorous
multivariate empirical test. Such a multivariate analysis would be challenging because of
the small number of cases, the difficulty of correctly specifying the model, and the
potentially large number of candidate control variables. Nonetheless, though such a
study is beyond the scope of this paper, it is an important item on the future research
agenda.

B. Accounting for Apparent Patterns: What Explains the “Double
Hump”?

The main conclusions of this study are negative – though the different coding,
weighting, and aggregation methods yield somewhat different results, none of them
clearly confirms the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis, and almost all of them are in fact
disconfirmatory to some degree. However, some patterns do seem to appear in the data,
and, though not especially robust, these patterns invite preliminary attempts at
explanation. The most interesting such pattern is the apparent “double hump” in the
average deference signal over the 1977-2002 period: there appears to be a spike in the
early 1980s and a decline in the mid-to-late 1980s, and a second spike in the early-to-mid
1990s, with a decline in the late 1990s. While remaining duly mindful that this apparent
“pattern” may be a coincidence or the result of flawed aggregation techniques, it is
nonetheless useful to consider some potential reasons such a pattern might appear, and
the additional hypotheses that such explanations would imply.
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1. The “Presidential Mandates” Hypothesis – Regulatory
Reversals and Circuit Court Overreactions

The most striking aspect of the “double hump” pattern is that the deference spikes
occur primarily in the first presidential term following a change in the partisan control of
the executive. That is, the data suggests that, after the election of a new president of a
new political party, the Supreme Court tends to send increasingly pro-deference signals
for several years, with the trend reversing in the latter half of the president’s time in
office. Why might this be the case?
It may be that the Supreme Court has relatively constant preferences with regard
to the appropriate level of judicial deference, but the circuit courts consistently
underestimate the degree to which they ought to defer to administrative decisions that
appear to represent dramatic changes in policy.94 If agency actions that appear to
represent significant departures from past practice are more prone to invalidation at the
circuit court level, but the Supreme Court is not significantly more likely to desire
invalidation of such actions, then the election of a new president with a new regulatory
agenda is especially likely to trigger instructions from the Supreme Court that the lower
courts should treat agency action more deferentially. That is, the Supreme Court may be
more willing than the circuit courts to recognize a presidential “mandate” to effect
substantial changes in regulatory policy. This result is not necessarily inconsistent with a
rational choice perspective on deference doctrine, but it makes different assumptions than
the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis about the Supreme Court’s preferences. The “presidential

94

There may be rationalist explanations as to why circuit court judges would consistently misestimate the
Supreme Court’s preferences in this way, or it may reflect some kind of cognitive limitation. Or, it may be
that only a minority of circuit court judges behave in this way, but plaintiffs challenging controversial
administrative action may be able to engage in forum shopping, increasing the chances that these cases will
be heard before circuit judges who are more prone than their brethren on other circuits or the Supreme
Court to strike down the agency action in question.
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mandate” theory has the additional advantage of better explaining the findings regarding
the difference in the Court’s treatment of executive and independent agency cases.
The “presidential mandate” hypothesis implies a clear prediction for what ought
to happen under George W. Bush: there ought to be another deference spike between
about 2002-2004. If Bush wins a second term, the trend would then be expected to
reverse, with increasingly anti-deference signals into 2008. If a Democrat wins the 2004
election, we would expect strongly pro-deference signals in the 2005-2008 period. The
presidential mandate hypothesis also implies clear out-of-sample predictions for earlier
periods. For example, one ought to observe a spike in deference during the first Nixon
administration, a decline under Ford, and perhaps a spike in the Carter administration as
well – though the fact that Carter was only a one-term president might make the pattern
harder to discern.

2. The “Goldilocks” Hypothesis – Supreme Court Centrism and
Circuit Court Extremism

Another possible explanation for the double hump pattern suggested by the data is
that the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis is generally correct about the Supreme Court’s
instrumentalist, policy-oriented strategy, but errs with regard to its assumptions about the
Court’s political preferences. It may be that the Supreme Court was relatively moderate
throughout the relevant sample period. When the circuit courts are similarly moderate,
the Court contracted the level of judicial deference, authorizing more vigorous judicial
scrutiny. But, when the circuit courts tended to be ideologically extreme – in either
direction – the Supreme Court signaled the need for greater judicial deference to
administrative agency decisions.
This hypothesis may find some support in the observation that the two periods
when the Supreme Court appeared to send the most anti-deference signals – 1989-1992
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and 1999-2002 – correspond to roughly similar average circuit court judge ideology
scores (+0.128, for 1989-1992; -0.025 for 1999-2002). (These numbers are highly
inexact measurements of true ideology, so extreme caution ought to be exercised in their
interpretation.) More qualitatively, the trends with regard to circuit court ideology
suggest that in the 1989-1992 period, the circuits had recently become relatively
moderate after a sustained period of marked liberalism, and in the 1999-2002 period the
circuits had again become relatively moderate, this time after several years of being quite
conservative. While hardly conclusive, this evidence is suggestive support for the
hypothesis of a relatively centrist Supreme Court (or swing justices), willing to contract
deference doctrine when the circuit courts are relatively centrist as well, but likely to
expand deference doctrine whenever the circuit courts are anything other than a roughly
equal mix of liberals and conservatives. Thus, the circuit courts in the early Reagan years
were too liberal, the circuit courts in the early Clinton years were too conservative, but
during both Bush administrations, the courts were (ideologically) just right. This
hypothesis has the additional attractive feature of being able to account for why the
Cohen-Spitzer theory seems to do a better job explaining the divergence in Rehnquist and
Stevens’ votes than it does explaining the voting patterns of the Court as a whole.
Discerning the predictions of this hypothesis for the latter part of George W.
Bush’s presidency requires making some assumptions about how rapidly Bush will be
able to shift the ideology of the circuit courts. If, as seems likely, it will take some time
before the circuits become substantially more conservative, then the hypothesis would
predict no significant expansion in deference doctrine during Bush’s first term. The
predictions for a second Bush term, if it comes to pass, would be more ambiguous. On
the one hand, the circuits by then may have become too conservative for the Supreme
Court’s liking, which might imply increasingly pro-deference signals. On the other hand,
the Court’s own ideological preferences may have shifted by then, since it is almost
certain that some members of the current Court will be replaced before 2008. Also, even
Stephenson – Judicial Deference Draft 7/13/2004

52

if the circuit courts become more conservative under Bush, they might still be
ideologically closer to the Supreme Court than the Bush executive agencies, which would
imply that the Court would continue to favor less judicial deference. If a Democrat wins
in 2008, then, presuming this partisan alternation keeps the balance in the circuit courts
roughly even, we would expect the Supreme Court to continue to send relatively weak
deference signals.
The foregoing discussion indicates that the two most plausible explanations for
the “double hump” deference pattern that emerges in the data imply sharply divergent
predictions about what ought to happen in the next several years. If the presidential
mandates theory is correct, we would expect to see a notable expansion in deference
signals in 2003-2004, and perhaps into the early years of a second Bush term, if there is
one. If a Democrat wins the 2004 election, we would also expect relatively strong prodeference signals in this period. If the Supreme Court centrism theory is correct, we
should expect the Court to maintain the low-deference signals during this period,
especially during Bush’s first term. Stronger pro-deference signals would be expected in
a second Bush term unless Bush is able to move the ideology of the Supreme Court
markedly to the right (say, if O’Connor or Stevens leave the Court). In contrast, the
goldilocks hypothesis would predict continuing low-deference signals if a Democrat
takes office in 2004.

CONCLUSION
Shifting patterns in Supreme Court pronouncements regarding the appropriate
level of judicial scrutiny of administrative agency actions presents a puzzle for legal
scholars and social scientists interested in judicial behavior. Why is it that at certain
times the Court appears to stress the importance of judicial deference and restraint, but at
other points the Court’s opinions seem more sympathetic to aggressive judicial review of
agency decisions? Linda Cohen and Matthew Spitzer, drawing on the methodology of
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rational choice and the literature on judicial politics, developed a simple, compelling
explanation for the Court’s behavior: the Court seeks to ensure favorable policy outcomes
by calling for deference when the agencies are more closely ideologically aligned with
the Supreme Court than the lower federal courts, but the Court calls for more searching
judicial review when the circuit courts are more ideologically similar to the Supreme
Court than the agencies are. Considerations of relative political alignment, Cohen and
Spitzer implicitly claimed, could explain observable shifts in deference doctrine even
without controlling for other factors.
In this paper, I attempt to advance the research agenda on this topic by reassessing the Cohen-Spitzer theory, in particular by testing their explicit out-of-sample
predictions about deference doctrine during the Clinton administration. I find little
evidence to support the Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis, at least in the strong form in which
Cohen and Spitzer originally presented it. Rather than a contraction of deference doctrine
in the 1990s, there seems to be a significant expansion, comparable to the expansion that
took place in the mid-1980s. While this observation does not necessarily refute the
Cohen-Spitzer hypothesis, it invites deep skepticism and demonstrates the need for
reexamination of our assumptions and theories about the politics of administrative law
decision-making in the Supreme Court.
I consider two possible alternative theories that are more consistent with the data I
report than the original version of the Cohen-Spitzer thesis. First, it may be that spikes in
deference tend to correspond with the election of a new president of a different party,
because shifts in partisan control of the executive tend to generate cases of the type where
lower federal courts are excessively likely (from the Supreme Court’s perspective) to
invalidate agency action. Second, it may be that spikes in deference correspond to
periods when the circuit courts become ideologically extreme in either direction, but the
Supreme Court contracts deference doctrine when the circuits are more moderate –
perhaps reflecting the relatively centrist position of the Supreme Court. These two
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hypotheses (which are by no means exhaustive) imply different predictions for what is
likely to happen in the years after my sample period ends. If the presidential mandates
theory is correct, deference should expand in 2003-2004. If the Supreme Court centrism
theory is correct, then deference should probably stay at about the same low level as in
2001-2002.
The most important objective of this paper is to re-open a line of inquiry that
many considered more or less closed after Cohen and Spitzer published their influential
papers on the subject. Future research should make use of more sophisticated
methodological techniques than those employed here, and should explore more nuanced
hypotheses, in order to better understand the political, ideological, and institutional forces
that shape Supreme Court deference doctrine.
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Table 1

1
2
3
4

Supreme
Court
Ideology
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative

Circuit
Court
Ideology
Conservative
Liberal
Conservative
Liberal

Executive
Agency
Ideology
Conservative
Conservative
Liberal
Liberal

Expected
Deference
Doctrine
?
High deference
Low deference
Depends:
-

-

5
6
7
8

Liberal
Liberal
Liberal
Liberal

Liberal
Conservative
Liberal
Conservative

Liberal
Liberal
Conservative
Conservative
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High deference
if courts are
more liberal
than agencies
Low deference
if agencies are
more liberal
than courts

?
High deference
Low deference
Depends:
- Low deference

-

Expected
Policy/Case
Outcomes
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Liberal

Liberal
Liberal
Liberal
Conservative

if courts are
more liberal
than agencies
High deference
if agencies are
more liberal
than courts
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Table 2

Year
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

Average Circuit Judge Ideology
-0.15
-0.23
-0.27
-0.43
-0.46
-0.35
-0.31
-0.25
-0.17
-0.04
-0.01
+0.04
+0.07

Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
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Average Circuit Judge Ideology
+0.11
+0.14
+0.19
+0.21
+0.16
+0.13
+0.11
+0.09
+0.05
+0.04
-0.02
-0.03
-0.00
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Table 3

Ideology Score
Justice
Cohen-Spitzer
Segel-Cover
Bailey
Martin-Quinn
-1 (1-4)
-1.00 (1-2)
-0.503 (1)
-2.002 (1)
Marshall
0.7
(5-14)
-1.00
(1-2)
-0.405
(2)
-1.643 (2)
Brennan
0.7 (5-14)
0.50 (10)
-0.312 (3)
-0.553 (3)
Stevens
-1 (1-4)
-0.36 (4)
-0.270 (4)
-0.227 (4)
Ginsburg
-1 (1-4)
0.05 (6)
-0.229 (5)
-0.180 (5)
Breyer
0.7 (5-14)
0.77 (13-14)
-0.053 (7)
-0.073 (6)
Blackmun
0.7 (5-14)
0.34 (9)
-0.204 (6)
0.209 (7)
Souter
0.7 (5-14)
-0.50 (3)
0.099 (8)
0.403 (8)
Stewart
-1 (1-4)
0.00 (5)
0.145 (9)
0.407 (9)
White
0.7 (5-14)
0.67 (11)
0.203 (11-12)
0.809 (10)
Powell
0.7 (5-14)
0.27 (8)
0.203 (11-12)
1.293 (11)
Kennedy
1 (15-16)
0.17 (7)
0.191 (10)
1.309 (12)
O’Connor
0.7 (5-14)
0.77 (13-14)
0.354 (14)
1.468 (13)
Burger
1 (15-16)
1.00 (16)
0.317 (13)
2.433 (14)
Scalia
0.7 (5-14)
0.91 (15)
0.427 (16)
2.914 (15)
Rehnquist
0.7 (5-14)
0.68 (12)
0.372 (15)
3.909 (16)
Thomas
First number represents cardinal ideology score. Number in parentheses represents
ordinal ideological ranking, with (1) meaning most liberal justice of the sixteen, and
(16) meaning most conservative justice. More than one number in parentheses
indicates multiple judges with the same cardinal score.
Sign on Segal-Cover scores are opposite of those in original source, so that for all
four measures higher numbers indicate more conservative ideology.
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Table 4

Median (Mean) Supreme Court Ideology Score
Court
Cohen-Spitzer Segel-Cover
Bailey
Martin-Quinn
0.7
(0.322)
0.5
(0.124)
0.099
(-0.005)
0.403
(0.192)
1977-1981
Stewart departs July 3, 1981; O’Connor sworn in Sept. 25, 1981
0.7 (0.356)
0.5 (0.199)
0.145 (0.005)
0.407 (0.293)
1982-1986
Burger departs Sept. 26, 1986; Scalia sworn in Sept. 26, 1986
0.7 (0.389)
0.5 (0.224)
0.145 (0.001)
0.407 (0.400)
1987
Powell departs June 26, 1987; Kennedy sworn in Feb. 18, 1988
0.7 (0.389)
0.27 (0.18)
0.145 (0.001)
0.407 (0.454)
1988-1990
Brennan departs July 20, 1990; Souter sworn in Oct. 9, 1990
0.7 (0.389)
0.34 (0.329)
0.145 (0.023)
0.407 (0.660)
1991
Marshall departs Oct. 1, 1991; Thomas sworn in Oct. 23 1991
0.7 (0.578)
0.5 (0.516)
0.191 (0.121)
1.293 (1.316)
1992-1993
White departs June 28, 1993; Ginsburg sworn in Aug. 10, 1993
0.7 (0.578)
0.5 (0.476)
0.191 (0.075)
1.293 (1.246)
1994
Blackmun departs Aug. 3, 1994; Breyer sworn in Aug. 3, 1994
0.7 (0.389)
0.34 (0.400)
0.191 (0.055)
1.293 (1.234)
1995-2002
Table 5

Effect on Supreme Court ideology as measured by –
Median ideology score from:
Mean ideology score from:
Transition Cohen- Segal- Bailey Martin- Cohen- Segal- Bailey MartinPoint
Spitzer Cover
Quinn
Spitzer Cover
Quinn
0
1981-1982 0
+
+
+
+
+
+
0
0
0
1986-1987 0
+
+
+
0
0
0
0
1987-1988 0
+
0
0
0
1990-1991 0
+
+
+
+
1991-1992 0
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
0
0
0
0
1993-1994 0
0
0
1995-2002 0
A “+” indicates that the Supreme Court became more conservative at this transition
point, according to the specified indicator.
A “-“ indicates that the Supreme Court became more liberal at this transition point,
according to the specified indicator.
A “0” indicates that the specified indicator finds no change in the Supreme Court’s
ideology, according to the specified indicator.
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Table 6

Year Number of Supreme Court Cases
with Full Written Opinion
1977 142
1978 135
1979 138
1980 149
1981 138
1982 167
1983 162
1984 163
1985 151
1986 159
1987 152
1988 142
1989 143

Year Number of Supreme Court Cases
with Full Written Opinion
1990 139
1991 120
1992 114
1993 114
1994 87
1995 86
1996 75
1997 86
1998 93
1999 81
2000 77
2001 86
2002 81

(Source: Harvard Law Review, annual Supreme Court statistics)

Stephenson – Judicial Deference Draft 7/13/2004

60

Average Circuit Judge Ideology
0.3

0.2

0.1

0

-0.1

-0.2

-0.3

-0.4

-0.5
ALL CIRCUITS

Figure 1

Average Circuit Judge Ideology -- D.C. Circuit
0.3

0.2

0.1

0
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
-0.1

-0.2

-0.3

-0.4

-0.5

-0.6
DC Cir.

Figure 2

Stephenson – Judicial Deference Draft 7/13/2004

61

Average Circuit Judge Ideology -- 9th Circuit
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Supreme Court Mean Ideology Score -- Four Measures
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Reversal-Weighted Aggregate Deference Score (Cohen-Spitzer Method)

Deference Score

Figure 7

Reversal-Weighted Average Deference Score
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Reversal-Weighted Average Deference Score - with and without deflation by
number of cert denials
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Reversal-Weighted Average Deference Score

Reversal-Weighted Average Deference Score (deflated by cert denials)

Figure 9
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Annual Aggregate Deference Score
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Aggregate Influence-Weighted Deference Score [Moving Averages]
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Figure 12

Average Influence-Weighted Deference Score [Moving Average]
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Figure 13
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Number of Cases (with Full Opinion)

180
160

140
120
100

80
60
40

20
0

Number of Cases (wit h Full Opinion)

Figure 14

Stephenson – Judicial Deference Draft 7/13/2004

68

Executive v. Independent Agencies: Annual Aggregate Influence-Weighted Deference Score
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Figure 15

Executive v. Independent Agencies: Average Annual Influence-Weighted
Deference Score
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Figure 16
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Executive v Independent Agencies: Aggregate (2-Year Moving Average)
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Figure 17

Executive v. Independent Agencies: Aggregate (4-Year Moving Average)
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Executive v. Independent Agencies: Average (2-Year Moving Average)
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Executive v. Independent Agencies: Average (4-Year Moving Average)
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Figure 20
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Liberal v. Conservative Circuits, 1985-1991

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

2-Year Average Influence-Weighted Deference Score (conservative circuits only)
2-Year Average Influence-Weighted Deference Score (liberal circuits only)

Figure 21

Liberal v. Conservative Circuits, 1996-2002

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2-Year Average Influence-Weighted Deference Score (conservative circuits only)
2-Year Average Influence-Weighted Deference Score (liberal circuits only)

Figure 22
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Two-Year Influence-Weighted Average Deference Score
(Conservative Circuits Only)

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

2-Year Average Influence-Weighted Deference Score (conservative circuits only)

Figure 23
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Difference in Deference Signal - Rehnquist v. Stevens
(Annual Citation-Weighted Averge)

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Rehnquist - Stevems deference signal difference

Figure 24
Difference in Deference Signal - Rehnquist v. Stevens
(Two-Year Citation-Weighted Averge)

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Rehnquist - Stevens deference signal difference (2yr Avg)

Figure 25
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Difference in Deference Signal - Rehnquist v. Stevens
(Four-Year Citation-Weighted Averge)

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Rehnquist - Stevens deference signal difference (4yr Avg)

Figure 26
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APPENDIX A: Complete List of Cases Included in the Sample
2001 TERM
Yellow Transp v. Michigan
123 S.Ct. 371
INS v. Ventura
123 S.Ct. 353
536 U.S. 238
US v. Fior D'Italia
National RR Corp v. Morgan
536 U.S. 101
Chevron v. Echazabal
536 U.S. 73
SEC v. Zandford
535 U.S. 813
Verizon v. FCC
535 U.S. 467
Barnhart v. Walton
535 U.S. 212
Ragsdale v. Wolverine WW
535 U.S. 81
Edelman v. Lynchberg College
535 U.S. 106
New York v. FERC
535 U.S. 1
Wis. Dep of Health v. Blumer
534 U.S. 473
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal
534 U.S. 438
Nat'l Cable & Telecom v. Gulf Power 534 U.S. 327
2000 TERM
Zadvydas v. Davis
533 U.S. 678
INS v. St. Cyr
533 U.S. 289
US v. Mead
533 U.S. 218
NLRB v. KY River Comm. Care
532 U.S. 706
US v. Cleveland Indians
532 U.S. 200
Whitman v. American Trucking
531 U.S. 457
Lopez v. Davis
531 U.S. 230
Sol. Waste Agy v. Army Corps of
Eng.
531 U.S. 159
1999 TERM
Geier v. American Honda
529 U.S. 861
Christensen v. Harris County
529 U.S. 576
Norfolk Southern v. Shanklin
529 U.S. 344
FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco
529 U.S. 120
Shalala v. Ill Council on Longterm
Care
529 U.S. 1
1998 TERM
Sutton v. United Air
527 U.S. 471
NASA v. FLRA
527 U.S. 229
Dickinson v. Zurko
527 U.S. 150
INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre
526 U.S. 415
US v. Haggar Apparel
526 U.S. 380
Natl Fed of Fed Empl v. Dep of Inter. 526 U.S. 86
Your Home Nursing v. Shalala
525 U.S. 449
AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board
525 U.S. 366
1997 TERM
Bragdon v. Abbott
524 U.S. 624
Atlantic Mut Ins Co v. C.I.R.
523 U.S. 382
Nat'l Credit Union v. 1st Nat'l Bank 522 U.S. 479

Regions Hospital v. Shalala
Allentown Mack Sales v. NLRB
1996 TERM
US v. O'Hagan
US v. LaBonte
Dunn v. CFTC
Auer v. Robbins
1995 TERM
Medtronic v. Lohr
Smiley v. Citibank
Holly Farms v. NLRB
Neal v. US
1994 TERM
NLRB v. Town & Country Electric
Miller v. Johnson
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter
Reno v. Koray
Shalala v. Guernsey Mem. Hosp.
NationsBank v. Variable Annuity
1993 TERM
Brown v. Gardner
Thomas Jefferson U. v. Shalala
OWCP v. Greenwhich Collieries
MCI v. AT&T
PUD No. 1 v. Wash Dep of Ecol
NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement
Co
Chicago v. Environmental Def Fund
ABF Freight v. NLRB
1992 TERM
Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala
Lincoln v. Vigil
Reno v. Flores
1991 TERM
Estate of Cowart v. Niklos Drilling
US v. Thompson/Center Arms Co.
US v. Alaska
Natl RR Passenger v. Boston &
Maine
Arkansas v. Oklahoma
Presley v. Etowah County
Lechmere v. NLRB
INS v. Elias-Zacarias
1990 TERM
INS v. Natl Center for Immigrants
Rts
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522 U.S. 448
522 U.S. 359
521 U.S. 642
520 U.S. 751
519 U.S. 465
519 U.S. 452
518 U.S. 470
517 U.S. 735
517 U.S. 392
516 U.S. 284
516 U.S. 85
515 U.S. 900
515 U.S. 687
515 U.S. 50
514 U.S. 87
513 U.S. 251
513 U.S. 115
512 U.S. 504
512 U.S. 267
512 U.S. 218
511 U.S. 700
511 U.S. 571
511 U.S. 328
510 U.S. 317
508 U.S. 402
508 U.S. 182
507 U.S. 292
505 U.S. 469
504 U.S. 505
503 U.S. 569
503 U.S. 407
503 U.S. 91
502 U.S. 491
502 U.S. 527
502 U.S. 478

502 U.S. 183
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Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines
Gregory v. Ashcroft
Litton Financial Printing v. NLRB
Rust v. Sullivan
American Hosp Assn v. NLRB
Cottage Savings v. CIR
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil
Martin v. OHS Review Comm'n
Mobil Oil v. United Distribution
Demarest v. Manspeaker
1989 TERM
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC
Maislin Industries v. Primary Steel
PBGC v. LTV Corp.
Fort Stewart Schools v. FLRA
Davis v. US
Dept of Treasury, IRS v. FLRA
NLRB v. Curtis Matheson Scientific
Adams Fruit v. Barrett
Dole v. United Steelworkers
Sullivan v. Everhart
Sullivan v. Zebley
1988 TERM
PERS of Ohio v. Betts
Mead Corp. v. Tilly
Marsh v. Oregon Nat. Res. Council
1987 TERM
Bowen v. Georgetown Hospital
Mississippi Power & Light v.
Mississippi
Webster v. Doe
Huffman v. Western Nuclear
K Mart v. Cartier
FERC v. Martin Exploration
New York v. FCC
EEOC v. Commercial Office
Products
DeBartolo v. FL Gulf Coast Building
Traynor v. Turnage
Gardebring v. Jenkins
FLRA v. Aberdeen Proving Ground
Bethesda Hosp. v. Bowen
1986 TERM
NLRB v. United Food & Comm.
Wrkrs.
Mullins Coal v. OWCP
Fall River Dyeing v. NLRB
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca

501 U.S. 680
501 U.S. 452
501 U.S. 190
500 U.S. 173
499 U.S. 606
499 U.S. 554
499 U.S. 244
499 U.S. 144
498 U.S. 211
498 U.S. 184
497 U.S. 547
497 U.S. 116
496 U.S. 633
495 U.S. 641
495 U.S. 472
494 U.S. 922
494 U.S. 775
494 U.S. 638
494 U.S. 26
494 U.S. 83
493 U.S. 521
492 U.S. 158
490 U.S. 714
490 U.S. 360
488 U.S. 204
487 U.S. 354
486 U.S. 592
486 U.S. 663
486 U.S. 281
486 U.S. 204
486 U.S. 57
486 U.S. 107
485 U.S. 568
485 U.S. 535
485 U.S. 415
485 U.S. 409
485 U.S. 399

484 U.S. 112
484 U.S. 135
482 U.S. 27
480 U.S. 421

Lukhard v. Reed
481 U.S. 368
Pleasant Grove v. U.S.
479 U.S. 462
Bowen v. Yuckert
482 U.S. 137
1985 TERM
CFTC v. Schor
478 U.S. 833
US DOT v. Paralyzed Veterans
477 U.S. 597
Atkins v. Rivera
477 U.S. 154
Young v. Community Nutrition Inst. 476 U.S. 974
Lyng v. Payne
476 U.S. 926
Bowen v. Amer. Hosp. Ass'n
476 U.S. 610
LA Public Service Com'n v. FCC
476 U.S. 355
US v. City of Fulton
475 U.S. 657
Bd of Gov of Fed v. Dimension
474 U.S. 361
1984 TERM
US v. Riverside Bayview Homes
474 U.S. 121
Pattern Makers League v. NLRB
473 U.S. 95
US v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce
472 U.S. 713
Mountain States T&T v. Pueblo
472 U.S. 237
CT Dept of Income Maintenance v.
Heckler
471 U.S. 524
NLRB v. Int'l Longshoremans Assn 473 U.S. 61
Heckler v. Chaney
470 U.S. 821
Chemical Mnfrs Assn v. NRDC
470 U.S. 116
Lawrence Cnty v. Lead-Deadwood 469 U.S. 256
1983 TERM
ICC v. American Trucking Assn
467 U.S. 354
Securities Ind Assn v. Fed Reserve 468 U.S. 137
Sure-Tan v. NLRB
467 U.S. 883
Chevron v. NRDC
467 U.S. 837
Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp
467 U.S. 691
Aluminum Co v. Central Lincoln
467 U.S. 380
EEOC v. Shell Oil
466 U.S. 54
1982 TERM
BATF v. FLRA
464 U.S. 89
Pub Serv Cmmn of NY v. Mid-LA
Gas
463 U.S. 319
Motor Veh. Mfrs Assn v. State Farm 463 U.S. 29
Nat Asn Greeting Card Pubs v. USPS 462 U.S. 810
Baltimore Gas & Elec. v. NRDC
462 U.S. 87
Bill Johnson's Restaurants v. NLRB 461 U.S. 731
Bob Jones Univ. v. US
461 U.S. 574
Heckler v. Campbell
461 U.S. 458
Am. Paper Inst. v. Am. Elec Pwr Svc 461 U.S. 402
Comm Tel of So Cal v. Gottfried
459 U.S. 498
1981 TERM
Fidelity Fed Sav & Loan v. de la
Cuesta
458 U.S. 141
Schweiker v. Hogan
457 U.S. 569
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Blum v. Bacon
N Haven Bd of Ed v. Bell
Herweg v. Ray
US v. Vogel Fertilizer
US v. Clark
Bonanno Linen Service v. NLRB
1980 TERM
NLRB v. Hendricks Cnty Rural Elec
FEC v. Dem. Senate Camp. Comm
CBS v. FCC
Haig v. Agee
Schweiker v. Gray Panthers
Am Textile Mfrs Inst v. Donovan
Howe v. Smith
Anderson Bros Ford v. Valencia
St. Martin's Evangelical Lutheran v.
SD
Rowan Companies v. US
FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild
Com of IRS v. Portland Cement Co.
Steadman v. SEC
Brd of Gov of Fed v. Invest. Co. Inst.
Conrail v. Natl Assn Recycling Inds.
EEOC v. Assoc. Dry Goods
1979 TERM
Potomac Electric Power v. OWCP
EPA v. Nat'l Crushed Stone
Indus. Union Dep. v. Amer. Petr.
Inst.
Mohasco Corp v. Silver
Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall
US v. Euge
Ford Motor Credit Co v. Milhollin
NLRB v. Yeshiva University
Stryker's Bay Neighborhood v.
Karlen
1978 TERM
NLRB v. Baptist Hospital
US v. Rutherford

457 U.S. 132
456 U.S. 512
455 U.S. 265
455 U.S. 16
454 U.S. 555
454 U.S. 404
454 U.S. 170
454 U.S. 27
453 U.S. 367
453 U.S. 280
453 U.S. 34
452 U.S. 490
452 U.S. 273
452 U.S. 205
451 U.S. 772
452 U.S. 247
450 U.S. 582
450 U.S. 156
450 U.S. 91
450 U.S. 46
449 U.S. 609
449 U.S. 590
449 U.S. 268
449 U.S. 64
448 U.S. 607
447 U.S. 807
445 U.S. 1
444 U.S. 707
444 U.S. 555
444 U.S. 672
444 U.S. 223

Andrus v. Sierra Club
442 U.S. 347
SE Comm College v. Davis
442 U.S. 397
Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB
441 U.S. 448
Gladstone v. Bellwood
441 U.S. 91
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp
440 U.S. 689
NLRB v. Catholic Bishops of
Chicago
440 U.S. 490
Nat Muffler Dealers Assn v. US
440 U.S. 472
Miller v. Youakim
440 U.S. 125
Int Broth of Teamsters v. Daniel
439 U.S. 551
Thor Power Tools v. CIR
439 U.S. 522
1977 TERM
Federal Reserve v. 1st Lincolnwood 439 U.S. 234
FCC v. Pacifica
438 U.S. 726
California v. U.S.
438 U.S. 645
Eastex v. NLRB
437 U.S. 556
Beth Israel Hosp v. NLRB
437 U.S. 483
Zenith Radio v. US
437 U.S. 443
FCC v. Nat Citzns Com for
Brdcasting
436 U.S. 775
In re Trans Alska Pipeline Rate Cases 436 U.S. 631
Quern v. Mandley
436 U.S. 725
California v. Southland Royalty
436 U.S. 519
SEC v. Sloan
436 U.S. 103
Vermont Yankee v. NRDC
435 U.S. 519
US v. Bd of Comrs of Sheffield, Ala 435 U.S. 110
NLRB v. Local Union No.103
434 U.S. 335
Adamo Wrecking Co v. US
434 U.S. 275
1976 TERM
Batterton v. Francis
432 U.S. 416
Beal v. Doe
432 U.S. 438
TWA v. Hardison
432 U.S. 63
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours v. Collins 432 U.S. 46
U.S. v. Larionoff
431 U.S. 864
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours v. Train
430 U.S. 112
Piper v. Chris-Craft
430 U.S. 1
NLRB v. Enterprise Assn
429 U.S. 507

442 U.S. 773
442 U.S. 544
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APPENDIX B Coding of Ambiguous Cases
Case
Nat’l RR
Corp. v.
Morgan

Citation
536 U.S. 101

Verizon v.
FCC

535 U.S. 467

U.S. v. Mead

533 U.S. 218

Whitman v.
American
Trucking

531 U.S. 457

AT&T v.
Iowa Utilities
Board

525 U.S. 366

Good
Samaritan
Hosp. v.
Shalala
Lechmere v.
NLRB

508 U.S. 402

Martin v.
OHS Review
Comm’n

499 U.S. 144

K Mart v.
Cartier

486 U.S. 281

Lyng v.
Payne

476 U.S. 926

NLRB v. Int’l
Longshorema
ns Assn

473 U.S. 61

502 U.S. 527

Coding Problem & My Assessment
Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Deference issue arose
apparently arose only with respect to point on which the Court reversed,
and only specific discussion of deference issue held Chevron
inapplicable. Therefore, this case was coded as anti-deference.
Court deferred on some issues but not on others. The issues on which
the Court granted deference were the most important issues, while the
other issues were largely peripheral, so this case was coded as prodeference.
Court reversed lower court’s ruling that tariff classification was not
entitled to any deference, but held that Skidmore rather than Chevron
deference applied. Coded as anti-deference because the case is most
often cited for the proposition that certain agency actions are not entitled
to full Chevron deference.
Court deferred on some issues but not on others. The issues on which
the Court granted deference appear to be the most important issues,
while the other issues were largely peripheral, so this case was coded as
pro-deference.
Court deferred on some issues but not others. The issues seemed
comparable in importance, and the pro- and anti-deference portions of
the holding were cited with approximately the same frequency, so this
case was coded as ambiguous.
Court deferred to agency, but used language cited in subsequent cases
indicating deference would be limited when the agency changes its
position. Because the case also contains pro-deference language and
ultimately defers to the agency, the case was coded as pro-deference.
Court holds that stare decisis principle trumps Chevron, but uses general
language about how agency actions are normally entitled to deference.
Because the Court does not defer, and the most important part of the
holding appears to be the limitation on deference, the case was coded as
anti-deference.
Court held that when Secretaries of Labor and Commerce issue
conflicting interpretations of ambiguous OSHA regulation, courts
should defer to Labor. Because the case is most widely cited for its
strong language explaining the policy rationale for judicial deference,
the case was coded as pro-deference.
The Court (in a fractured opinion) deferred to some customs service
regulations but held others conflicted with the language of the statute.
Because the case was overwhelmingly cited, in subsequent cases, for its
pro-deference language, the case was coded as pro-deference.
The Court deferred to the agency, but used language, cited in a few
subsequent cases, suggesting limits to agency discretion. Because the
outcome of the case and most of the opinion is predominantly
supporting of agency decision-making on the relevant point, the case
was coded as pro-deference.
The Court refused to enforce an NLRB order that the Court held was
inconsistent with the statute, but made some general statements, citied in
subsequent cases, about the deference normally due NLRB
interpretations of that statute. Because of the outcome of the case and
the language on limits to the deference due the NLRB, the decision was
coded as anti-deference.
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Securities
Ind. Assn. v
Federal
Reserve
Public
Service
Comm’n of
NY v. MidLouisiana Gas

468 U.S. 137

463 U.S. 319

North Haven
Bd. of Ed. v.
Bell

456 U.S. 512

Amer.
Textiles Mfr.
Inst. v.
Donovan
NLRB v.
Baptist
Hospital

452 U.S. 490

442 U.S. 773

The Court used some general language about the deference normally
due to Fed interpretations of the relevant statute, but the Court also
stressed limits on that deference and invalidated the Fed’s action in this
case. Thus, the decision was coded as anti-deference.
The Court held that a FERC rule was inconsistent with the relevant
statute, but the Court reversed part of the lower court opinion in order to
give FERC discretion to make certain policy choices on remand.
However, the overall tone of the case, and the propositions for which it
is most cited, stress limitations on agency authority, the case was coded
as anti-deference.
The Court upheld anti-discrimination regulations promulgated by HEW,
and noted that agency interpretations are normally entitled to great
deference, but asserted that the ordinary level of deference was not
appropriate in that particular case. This case was therefore coded as
ambiguous.
The Court upheld one agency decision but invalidated another. Because
the pro- and anti-deference portions of the case appeared equally
important, this case was coded as ambiguous.
The Court upheld one agency decision but invalidated another. Because
the pro- and anti-deference portions of the case appeared equally
important, this case was coded as ambiguous.
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APPENDIX C: Cases Not Involving Review of a Federal Appellate Decision
Case
Yellow Transp. v. Michigan
Wisconsin Dept. of Health v. Blumer
Smiley v. Citibank
Miller v. Johnson
PUD No. 1 v. Washington Dept. of Ecology
U.S. v. Alaska
Presley v. Etowah County
Mississippi Power & Light v. Mississippi
Pleasant Grove v. U.S.
Atkins v. Rivera
Federal Fidelity Sav. & Loan v. de la Cuesta
Schweiker v. Hogan
St. Martins v. South Dakota
U.S. v. Bd. Of Commissioners of Sheffield

Citation
123 S.Ct. 371
534 U.S. 473
517 U.S. 735
515 U.S. 900
511 U.S. 700
503 U.S. 569
502 U.S. 491
487 U.S. 354
479 U.S. 462
477 U.S. 154
458 U.S. 141
457 U.S. 569
451 U.S. 772
435 U.S. 110
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Case Origin
Michigan Supreme Court
Wisconsin Court of Appeals
California Supreme Court
Fed District, S.D. Georgia
Washington Supreme Court
Original jurisdiction
Fed District, M.D. Alabama
Mississippi Supreme Court
Fed District, D.C.
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
California Court of Appeals
Fed District, Massachusetts
South Dakota Supreme Court
Fed District, Alabama
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Appendix D: Cases Ranked By Influence Score
Rank Case
Cite
1
Chevron v. NRDC
467 U.S. 837
2
Motor Veh. Mfrs Assn
v. State Farm
463 U.S. 29
3
Heckler v. Campbell
461 U.S. 458
4
Bowen v. Georgetown
Hospital
488 U.S. 204
5
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca 480 U.S. 421
6
Marsh v. Oregon Nat.
Res. Council
490 U.S. 360
7
Heckler v. Chaney
470 U.S. 821
8
Bowen v. Yuckert
482 U.S. 137
9
K Mart v. Cartier
486 U.S. 281
10
U.S. v. Larionoff
431 U.S. 864
11
Thomas Jefferson U. v.
Shalala
512 U.S. 504
12
Batterton v. Francis
432 U.S. 416
13
Ford Motor Credit Co v.
Milhollin
444 U.S. 555
14
Mullins Coal v. OWCP 484 U.S. 135
15
Martin v. OHS Review
Comm'n
499 U.S. 144
16
FEC v. Dem. Senate
Camp. Comm
454 U.S. 27
17
NLRB v. Catholic
Bishops of Chicago
440 U.S. 490
18
Nat Muffler Dealers
Assn v. US
440 U.S. 472
19
NLRB v. United Food
& Comm. Wrkrs.
484 U.S. 112
20
Maislin Industries v.
Primary Steel
497 U.S. 116
21
Christensen v. Harris
County
529 U.S. 576
22
Sure-Tan v. NLRB
467 U.S. 883
23
OWCP v. Greenwhich
Collieries
512 U.S. 267
24
Sullivan v. Zebley
493 U.S. 521
25
Stryker's Bay
Neighborhood v. Karlen 444 U.S. 223
26
INS v. Elias-Zacarias
502 U.S. 478
27
Zenith Radio v. US
437 U.S. 443
28
Zadvydas v. Davis
533 U.S. 678
29
Auer v. Robbins
519 U.S. 452
30
EEOC v. Arabian
American Oil
499 U.S. 244
31
Young v. Community
Nutrition Inst.
476 U.S. 974
32
Vermont Yankee v.
NRDC
435 U.S. 519

Score
4.85
4.67
4.6
4.51
4.34
4.26
4.03
3.99
3.89
3.81

33
34
35
36
37
38
39

3.8
3.75

40
41
42
43
44

3.71
3.7

45
46

3.66
3.65

47
48
49

3.63

50

3.57

51

3.54

52

3.49

53

3.48
3.27
3.27
3.25
3.16
3.16
3.16
3.15
3.11
3.1

54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

3.06
64
3.02
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Chemical Mnfrs Assn v.
NRDC
Potomac Electric Power
v. OWCP
US v. Mead
Ford Motor Co. v.
NLRB
Baltimore Gas & Elec.
v. NRDC
Rust v. Sullivan
US v. Nat'l Bank of
Commerce
Beal v. Doe
Medtronic v. Lohr
BATF v. FLRA
Arkansas v. Oklahoma
Bonanno Linen Service
v. NLRB
Reno v. Koray
Com of IRS v. Portland
Cement Co.
Blum v. Bacon
INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre
NLRB v. Yeshiva
University
Bd of Gov of Fed v.
Dimension
Pauley v. BethEnergy
Mines
Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter
Shalala v. Guernsey
Mem. Hosp.
Fall River Dyeing v.
NLRB
NLRB v. Local Union
No.103
US v. Rutherford
US v. Vogel Fertilizer
US v. LaBonte
Dole v. United
Steelworkers
Gardebring v. Jenkins
EEOC v. Commercial
Office Products
PBGC v. LTV Corp.
Allentown Mack Sales
v. NLRB
Am. Paper Inst. v. Am.
Elec Pwr Svc

470 U.S. 116

3.01

449 U.S. 268
533 U.S. 218

2.99
2.94

441 U.S. 448

2.92

462 U.S. 87
500 U.S. 173

2.88
2.84

472 U.S. 713
432 U.S. 438
518 U.S. 470
464 U.S. 89
503 U.S. 91

2.84
2.83
2.83
2.82
2.82

454 U.S. 404
515 U.S. 50

2.81
2.8

450 U.S. 156
457 U.S. 132
526 U.S. 415

2.79
2.76
2.74

444 U.S. 672

2.73

474 U.S. 361

2.7

501 U.S. 680

2.69

515 U.S. 687

2.68

514 U.S. 87

2.68

482 U.S. 27

2.66

434 U.S. 335
442 U.S. 544
455 U.S. 16
520 U.S. 751

2.65
2.62
2.62
2.59

494 U.S. 26
485 U.S. 415

2.58
2.55

486 U.S. 107
496 U.S. 633

2.5
2.5

522 U.S. 359

2.49

461 U.S. 402

2.46

82

65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

SEC v. Sloan
436 U.S. 103
Natl RR Passenger v.
Boston & Maine
503 U.S. 407
Schweiker v. Gray
Panthers
453 U.S. 34
NationsBank v. Variable
Annuity
513 U.S. 251
Int Broth of Teamsters
v. Daniel
439 U.S. 551
Webster v. Doe
486 U.S. 592
Sullivan v. Everhart
494 U.S. 83
US v. Riverside
Bayview Homes
474 U.S. 121
Adams Fruit v. Barrett 494 U.S. 638
Dunn v. CFTC
519 U.S. 465
Sol. Waste Agy v. Army
Corps of Eng.
531 U.S. 159
Rowan Companies v.
US
452 U.S. 247
Andrus v. Sierra Club 442 U.S. 347
SE Comm College v.
Davis
442 U.S. 397
Anderson Bros Ford v.
Valencia
452 U.S. 205
Schweiker v. Hogan
457 U.S. 569
Aluminum Co v.
Central Lincoln
467 U.S. 380
Miller v. Youakim
440 U.S. 125
Am Textile Mfrs Inst v.
Donovan
452 U.S. 490
PERS of Ohio v. Betts 492 U.S. 158
Geier v. American
Honda
529 U.S. 861
NLRB v. Town &
Country Electric
516 U.S. 85
Atkins v. Rivera
477 U.S. 154
Smiley v. Citibank
517 U.S. 735
ICC v. American
Trucking Assn
467 U.S. 354
NLRB v. Health Care &
Retirement Co
511 U.S. 571
Beth Israel Hosp v.
NLRB
437 U.S. 483
CFTC v. Schor
478 U.S. 833
Lincoln v. Vigil
508 U.S. 182
Litton Financial Printing
v. NLRB
501 U.S. 190
Securities Ind Assn v.
Fed Reserve
468 U.S. 137
Steadman v. SEC
450 U.S. 91
TWA v. Hardison
432 U.S. 63

2.45

98

2.45

99

2.44

100

2.41

101

2.38
2.34
2.33

102

2.32
2.31
2.3

104
105
106

2.27

107
108

2.27
2.26

103

109
110

2.26
2.26
2.21

111
112
113

2.21
2.18
2.17
2.17
2.16
2.14
2.14
2.11
2.08
2.07
2.06
2.06
2.05
2.03
2.02
2.02
2

114
115

116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

124
125
126
127
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E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours v. Collins
Indus. Union Dep. v.
Amer. Petr. Inst.
N Haven Bd of Ed v.
Bell
NLRB v. Curtis
Matheson Scientific
CT Dept of Income
Maintenance v. Heckler
AT&T v. Iowa Utilities
Board
US v. Clark
US v. Euge
US DOT v. Paralyzed
Veterans
Piper v. Chris-Craft
Good Samaritan Hosp.
v. Shalala
Brown v. Gardner
California v. Southland
Royalty
Dickinson v. Zurko
EPA v. Nat'l Crushed
Stone
Capital Cities Cable v.
Crisp
Neal v. US
Chicago v.
Environmental Def
Fund
Estate of Cowart v.
Niklos Drilling
Quern v. Mandley
FCC v. WNCN
Listeners Guild
Pub Serv Cmmn of NY
v. Mid-LA Gas
Regions Hospital v.
Shalala
ABF Freight v. NLRB
Atlantic Mut Ins Co v.
C.I.R.
LA Public Service
Com'n v. FCC
Edelman v. Lynchberg
College
US v. Bd of Comrs of
Sheffield, Ala
New York v. FCC
Bethesda Hosp. v.
Bowen

432 U.S. 46

1.98

448 U.S. 607

1.98

456 U.S. 512

1.97

494 U.S. 775

1.97

471 U.S. 524

1.94

525 U.S. 366
454 U.S. 555
444 U.S. 707

1.94
1.94
1.93

477 U.S. 597
430 U.S. 1

1.93
1.92

508 U.S. 402
513 U.S. 115

1.88
1.88

436 U.S. 519
527 U.S. 150

1.88
1.87

449 U.S. 64

1.87

467 U.S. 691
516 U.S. 284

1.87
1.85

511 U.S. 328

1.84

505 U.S. 469
436 U.S. 725

1.81
1.81

450 U.S. 582

1.8

463 U.S. 319

1.78

522 U.S. 448
510 U.S. 317

1.78
1.78

523 U.S. 382

1.75

476 U.S. 355

1.75

535 U.S. 106

1.74

435 U.S. 110
486 U.S. 57

1.73
1.71

485 U.S. 399

1.71

83

128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159

Demarest v.
498 U.S. 184
Manspeaker
Herweg v. Ray
455 U.S. 265
Whirlpool Corp. v.
Marshall
445 U.S. 1
St. Martin's Evangelical
Lutheran v. SD
451 U.S. 772
Federal Reserve v. 1st
Lincolnwood
439 U.S. 234
Traynor v. Turnage
485 U.S. 535
EEOC v. Assoc. Dry
Goods
449 U.S. 590
Holly Farms v. NLRB 517 U.S. 392
Fort Stewart Schools v.
FLRA
495 U.S. 641
Dept of Treasury, IRS v.
FLRA
494 U.S. 922
FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco
529 U.S. 120
FERC v. Martin
Exploration
486 U.S. 204
Your Home Nursing v.
Shalala
525 U.S. 449
Barnhart v. Walton
535 U.S. 212
Lechmere v. NLRB
502 U.S. 527
Fidelity Fed Sav &
Loan v. de la Cuesta
458 U.S. 141
NLRB v. Hendricks
Cnty Rural Elec
454 U.S. 170
Conrail v. Natl Assn
Recycling Inds.
449 U.S. 609
NLRB v. Baptist
Hospital
442 U.S. 773
Bob Jones Univ. v. US 461 U.S. 574
Bragdon v. Abbott
524 U.S. 624
Cottage Savings v. CIR 499 U.S. 554
INS v. St. Cyr
533 U.S. 289
FLRA v. Aberdeen
Proving Ground
485 U.S. 409
Presley v. Etowah
County
502 U.S. 491
Chevron v. Echazabal 536 U.S. 73
Bowen v. Amer. Hosp.
Ass'n
476 U.S. 610
MCI v. AT&T
512 U.S. 218
Ragsdale v. Wolverine
WW
535 U.S. 81
DeBartolo v. FL Gulf
Coast Building
485 U.S. 568
US v. Thompson/Center
Arms Co.
504 U.S. 505
Gladstone v. Bellwood 441 U.S. 91

1.71
1.67

160
161
162

1.66
1.63
1.62
1.62
1.6
1.59
1.57
1.57
1.56
1.55
1.51
1.49
1.48
1.48
1.47
1.47
1.46
1.45
1.44
1.43
1.41
1.41
1.4
1.35
1.35
1.35
1.34
1.32
1.32
1.31

163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
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US v. City of Fulton
475 U.S. 657
Pattern Makers League
v. NLRB
473 U.S. 95
E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours v. Train
430 U.S. 112
CBS v. FCC
453 U.S. 367
Lyng v. Payne
476 U.S. 926
Davis v. US
495 U.S. 472
Mead Corp. v. Tilly
490 U.S. 714
FCC v. Midwest Video
Corp
440 U.S. 689
Verizon v. FCC
535 U.S. 467
NLRB v. Enterprise
Assn
429 U.S. 507
FCC v. Nat Citzns Com
for Brdcasting
436 U.S. 775
US v. Cleveland Indians 532 U.S. 200
US v. Haggar Apparel 526 U.S. 380
Haig v. Agee
453 U.S. 280
Wis. Dep of Health v.
Blumer
534 U.S. 473
FCC v. Pacifica
438 U.S. 726
Adamo Wrecking Co v.
US
434 U.S. 275
NLRB v. KY River
Comm. Care
532 U.S. 706
Bill Johnson's
Restaurants v. NLRB
461 U.S. 731
Howe v. Smith
452 U.S. 273
Brd of Gov of Fed v.
Invest. Co. Inst.
450 U.S. 46
Thor Power Tools v.
CIR
439 U.S. 522
Mountain States T&T v.
Pueblo
472 U.S. 237
In re Trans Alska
Pipeline Rate Cases
436 U.S. 631
PUD No. 1 v. Wash
Dep of Ecol
511 U.S. 700
Lawrence Cnty v. LeadDeadwood
469 U.S. 256
US v. Alaska
503 U.S. 569
Pleasant Grove v. U.S. 479 U.S. 462
New York v. FERC
535 U.S. 1
Natl Fed of Fed Empl v.
Dep of Inter.
526 U.S. 86
Eastex v. NLRB
437 U.S. 556
INS v. Natl Center for
Immigrants Rts
502 U.S. 183
Mobil Oil v. United
Distribution
498 U.S. 211

1.31
1.3
1.3
1.28
1.27
1.25
1.24
1.23
1.22
1.17
1.13
1.1
1.06
1.04
1.04
1.03
1.03
1.02
0.99
0.99
0.98
0.98
0.95
0.91
0.88
0.88
0.86
0.82
0.81
0.81
0.79
0.78
0.78
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193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207

Norfolk Southern v.
529 U.S. 344
Shanklin
SEC v. Zandford
535 U.S. 813
Yellow Transp v.
Michigan
123 S.Ct. 371
INS v. Ventura
123 S.Ct. 353
Nat'l Credit Union v. 1st
Nat'l Bank
522 U.S. 479
Lopez v. Davis
531 U.S. 230
Lukhard v. Reed
481 U.S. 368
Nat Asn Greeting Card
Pubs v. USPS
462 U.S. 810
California v. U.S.
438 U.S. 645
Whitman v. American
Trucking
531 U.S. 457
US v. Fior D'Italia
536 U.S. 238
Reno v. Flores
507 U.S. 292
Metro Broadcasting v.
FCC
497 U.S. 547
Shalala v. Ill Council on
Longterm Care
529 U.S. 1
Huffman v. Western
Nuclear
486 U.S. 663

0.75

208

0.73

209

0.69
0.69

210
211
212

0.69
0.68
0.67

213
214

0.57
0.56
0.55
0.54
0.53

215
216

0.51

217
218
219
220

0.51

221

Comm Tel of So Cal v.
Gottfried
Nat'l Cable & Telecom
v. Gulf Power
US v. O'Hagan
Miller v. Johnson
National RR Corp v.
Morgan
American Hosp Assn v.
NLRB
NLRB v. Int'l
Longshoremans Assn
EEOC v. Shell Oil
Barnhart v. Sigmon
Coal
Sutton v. United Air
NASA v. FLRA
Gregory v. Ashcroft
Mississippi Power &
Light v. Mississippi
Mohasco Corp v. Silver

459 U.S. 498

0.48

534 U.S. 327
521 U.S. 642
515 U.S. 900

0.46
0.46
0.31

536 U.S. 101

0.31

499 U.S. 606

0.29

473 U.S. 61
466 U.S. 54

0.27
0.27

534 U.S. 438
527 U.S. 471
527 U.S. 229
501 U.S. 452

0.26
0.19
0.19
0.16

487 U.S. 354
447 U.S. 807

0.15
0.14

0.5
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APPENDIX E: Cases where Rehnquist and Stevens Divided on the Deference Issue
(boldface indicates which way the case came out)
CASE
2001 Term
National RR Corp v. Morgan
Wis. Dep’t of Health v. Blumer
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal
2000 Term
Zadvydas v. Davis
INS v. St. Cyr
NLRB v. Ky. River Comm. Care
Solid Waste Agy. V. Army Corps of Engineers
1999 Term
Geier v. Amer. Honda
Christensen v. Harris County
Norfolk Southern v. Shanklin
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tocacco
Shalala v. Ill. Council on Longterm Care
1998 Term
Sutton v. United Air
NASA v. FLRA
Dickinson v. Zurko
Nat’l Fed. of Fed. Empl. v. Dep. of Interior
1997 Term
Bragdon v. Abbott
Nat’l Credit Union v. 1st Nat’l Bank
Allentown Mack Sales v. NLRB
1996 Term
US v. O’Hagan
US v. LaBonte
1995 Term
Medtronic v. Lohr
Holly Farms v. NLRB
1994 Term
Miller v. Johnson
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter
Reno v. Koray
1993 Term
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala
OWCP v. Greenwhich Collieries
MCI v. AT&T
NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Co.
Chicago v. Env. Def. Fund
1992 Term
Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala
Reno v. Flores
1991 Term
US v. Thompson/Center Arms Co.
Presley v. Etoway County
Lechmere v. NLRB

Citation

Rehnquist Vote

Stevens Vote

536 U.S. 101
534 U.S. 473
534 U.S. 327

Pro-deference
Pro-deference
Anti-deference

Anti-deference
Anti-deference
Pro-deference

533 U.S. 678
533 U.S. 289
532 U.S. 706
531 U.S. 159

Pro-deference
Pro-deference
Anti-deference
Anti-deference

Anti-deference
Anti-deference
Pro-deference
Pro-deference

529 U.S. 861
529 U.S. 576
529 U.S. 344
529 U.S. 120
529 U.S. 1

Pro-deference
Anti-deference
Anti-deference
Anti-deference
Pro-deference

Anti-deference
Pro-deference
Pro-deference
Pro-deference
Anti-deference

527 U.S. 471
527 U.S. 229
527 U.S. 150
526 U.S. 86

Anti-deference
Anti-deference
Anti-deference
Anti-deference

Pro-deference
Pro-deference
Pro-deference
Pro-deference

524 U.S. 624
522 U.S. 479
522 U.S. 359

Anti-deference
Anti-deference
Anti-deference

Pro-deference
Pro-deference
Pro-deference

521 U.S. 642
520 U.S. 751

Anti-deference
Anti-deference

Pro-deference
Pro-deference

518 U.S. 470
517 U.S. 392

Anti-deference
Anti-deference

Pro-deference
Pro-deference

515 U.S. 900
515 U.S. 687
515 U.S. 50

Anti-deference
Anti-deference
Pro-deference

Pro-deference
Pro-deference
Anti-deference

512 U.S. 504
512 U.S. 267
512 U.S. 218
511 U.S. 571
511 U.S. 328

Pro-deference
Anti-deference
Anti-deference
Anti-deference
Anti-deference

Anti-deference
Pro-deference
Pro-deference
Pro-deference
Pro-deference

508 U.S. 402
507 U.S. 292

Pro-deference
Pro-deference

Anti-deference
Anti-deference

504 U.S. 505
502 U.S. 491
502 U.S. 478

Anti-deference
Anti-deference
Anti-deference

Pro-deference
Pro-deference
Pro-deference
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INS v. Elias Zacarias
1990 Term
Litton Financial Planning v. NLRB
Rust v. Sullivan
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil
1989 Term
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC
PBGC v. LTV Corp.
IRS v. FLRA
Dole v. United Steelworkers
Sullivan v. Everhart
Sullivan v. Zebley

502 U.S. 478

Pro-deference

Anti-deference

501 U.S. 190
500 U.S. 173
499 U.S. 244

Anti-deference
Pro-deference
Anti-deference

Pro-deference
Anti-deference
Pro-deference

497 U.S. 547
496 U.S. 633
494 U.S. 922
494 U.S. 26
494 U.S. 83
493 U.S. 521

Anti-deference
Pro-deference
Anti-deference
Pro-deference
Pro-deference
Anti-deference

Pro-deference
Anti-deference
Pro-deference
Anti-deference
Anti-deference
Pro-deference

490 U.S. 714

Anti-deference

Pro-deference

486 U.S. 281

Anti-deference

Pro-deference

482 U.S. 27
480 U.S. 421
479 U.S. 462

Anti-deference
Pro-deference
Anti-deference

Pro-deference
Anti-deference
Pro-deference

476 U.S. 974
476 U.S. 926

Pro-deference
Pro-deference

Anti-deference
Anti-deference

473 U.S. 95
472 U.S. 713
473 U.S. 61
470 U.S. 116
469 U.S. 256

Pro-deference
Pro-deference
Pro-deference
Pro-deference
Pro-deference

Anti-deference
Anti-deference
Anti-deference
Anti-deference
Anti-deference

467 U.S. 354
468 U.S. 137
467 U.S. 883
467 U.S. 380
466 U.S. 54

Pro-deference
Anti-deference
Anti-deference
Pro-deference
Anti-deference

Anti-deference
Pro-deference
Pro-deference
Anti-deference
Pro-deference

463 U.S. 29
461 U.S. 574

Pro-deference
Anti-deference

Anti-deference
Pro-deference

458 U.S. 141

Anti-deference

Pro-deference

454 U.S. 170
453 U.S. 34
452 U.S. 273

Anti-deference
Pro-deference
Pro-deference

Pro-deference
Anti-deference
Anti-deference

444 U.S. 707

Pro-deference

Anti-deference

441 U.S. 91
440 U.S. 689
440 U.S. 472

Anti-deference
Anti-deference
Pro-deference

Pro-deference
Pro-deference
Anti-deference

1988 Term

Mead Corp. v. Tilly
1987 Term
K Mart v. Cartier
1986 Term
Fall River Dyeing v. NLRB
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
Pleasant Grove v. US
1985 Term
Young v. Community Nutrition Inst.
Lyng v. Pane
1984 Term
Pattern Makers League v. NLRB
US v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce
NLRB v. Int’l Longshoremans Ass’n
Chemical Mfrs. Ass’n v. NRDC
Lawrence City v. Lead-Deadwood
1983 Term
ICC v. American Trucking Ass’n
Securities Ind. Ass’n v. Fed. Reserve
Sure-Tan v. NLRB
Aluminum Co. v. Central Lincoln
EEOC v. Shell Oil
1982 Term
Motor Veh. Mnfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm
Bob Jones Univ. v. US
1981 Term
Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan v. de la Cuesta
1980 Term
NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec.
Schweiker v. Gray Panthers
Howe v. Smith
1979 Term
US v. Euge
1978 Term
Gladstone v. Bellwood
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.
Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. US
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1977 Term
Eastex v. NLRB
Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB
Adamo Wrecking Co. v. US
1976 Term
Batterton v. Francis
US v. Larionoff
Piper v. Chris-Craft

437 U.S. 556
437 U.S. 483
434 U.S. 275

Anti-deference
Anti-deference
Anti-deference

Pro-deference
Pro-deference
Pro-deference

432 U.S. 416
431 U.S. 864
430 U.S. 1

Pro-deference
Anti-deference
Anti-deference

Anti-deference
Pro-deference
Pro-deference
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